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M OST contractual arrangements are either structured as op-
tions or include options as important elements. As a result,
many of the major doctrines of contract law effectively operate to
create or to set the terms of such options. For instance, it has long
been recognized that a contract that is enforceable only through
monetary liability operates in practice as an option, because as a
legal matter the promisor retains the power either to perform or to
breach and pay damages. Similarly, the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel, which attaches liability to precontractual statements in
cases where they are reasonably relied upon, effectively grants an
option to the relying party to enforce the promise or not as she
finds convenient. Similar options arise where contracts are void-
able-but not void-for reasons of mistake, lack of capacity, or
fraud.
Despite this connection, the law of contracts has often treated
options quite differently from other contractual transactions. Op-
tion contracts with an explicit zero premium were not enforceable
under the traditional common law, for instance, and even today are
only enforceable if the contracting parties undertake special for-
malities.' Conversely, the characterization of a transaction as an
option contract can have the effect of relieving parties from doc-
'See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(1) (1981); U.C.C. § 2-205 (2004).
trinal limitations on their contractual freedom, such as the duty to
mitigate damages or the rule that holds excessively high liquidated
damages void as penalties.
Such differential treatment is somewhat challenging to explain
from an economic viewpoint, both because all contracts resemble
options in the aforementioned sense, and because contracts that
are nominally structured as explicit options can be close economic
substitutes for contracts that are nominally structured as uncondi-
tional. For example, a party who is willing to accept a zero pre-
mium option with a given exercise or "strike" price should be
equally willing to accept a positive premium option with a corre-
spondingly lowered strike price or extended option term. Con-
versely, a party who is willing to accept a zero premium option with
a given term should be willing to accept a positive-premium option
with a correspondingly longer term. Why, then, should the law
draw a sharp distinction between zero premium and positive pre-
mium options?
Similarly, a party who demands a substantial prepaid deposit or
liquidated damage clause--economically equivalent to a high op-
tion premium and a low strike price-should be willing to agree to
a lower deposit or liquidated damages figure in exchange for a cor-
respondingly higher purchase price. What factors, then, apart from
a desire to avoid the constraints of the common law penalty doc-
trine, determine how parties choose between these possible alter-
natives? And how should the law distinguish, if at all, between
front loaded option contracts on the one hand, and large deposits
that are formally styled as options for the purpose of evading the
penalty doctrine on the other?
Such questions arise not just out of doctrinal puzzles but out of
transactional problems as well, even when the relevant transactions
are unconstrained by legal strictures. Sellers often fail to use op-
tion-based pricing policies in circumstances in which doing so
would be perfectly feasible and would appear to serve their inter-
est. For example, it has been argued in defense of the practice of
resale price maintenance ("RPM") or the awarding of lost-volume
damages that sellers need to charge an above-marginal-cost price
on retail output in order to cover the cost of precontractual or
overhead sales expenses. But such arguments assume that it is in-
feasible or unprofitable to charge customers for the seller's sales
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investments up-front through a cover charge or entrance fee that is
equivalent to a straightforward option. In most cases there are no
obvious barriers to doing so, but in the retail and wholesale context
such arrangements are rare, with the exception of a few superstores
organized as private purchasing clubs.
In order to begin to address such questions, it is necessary to set
out a substantive account of the efficient design of option con-
tracts-one that explains how contracting parties should strike the
balance among option premium, option term, and exercise price, in
order to maximize the expected surplus from exchange. This Arti-
cle will present such an account; it will show that the tradeoff be-
tween these various aspects of option contracts can affect the par-
ties' incentives to acquire and disclose information, to make
relation-specific investments, and to take efficient precautions
against breach. The appropriate balance between option premium,
option term, and exercise price, accordingly, ultimately depends on
the relative importance that the parties attach to these various
incentives.
This Article will also show how option contracts can be profita-
bly used in ways that do not necessarily improve the efficiency of
the underlying transaction but that advantage the parties using
them at the possible expense of others participating in the market.
For example, options can be used to signal or to screen for private
information in the context of adverse selection and can also be
used for purposes of price discrimination. To this extent, it may be
socially desirable to regulate the use of such arrangements if such
regulation can be accomplished without unduly sacrificing their ef-
ficiency advantages.
Some parts of my account will be familiar to readers conversant
with the economic literature on contracts or antitrust. The contri-
bution of this Article lies not in creating new theory but in synthe-
sizing theoretical analyses from a variety of literatures and special-
ized bodies of knowledge in order to develop a useful taxonomy of
the considerations that are relevant in deciding whether to struc-
ture a contractual relationship in the form of an option. Organizing
such insights into a more systematic conceptual framework helps us
to integrate and synthesize disparate bodies of practical knowledge
relating to various commercial and legal fields, including sales, in-
formation licensing, construction, financial instruments, and so on.
Such a synthesis, as I have argued elsewhere, enables insights from
one field to be translated and analogized for the purposes of cri-
tiquing and improving transactional planning in others.2
The organization of this Article will proceed as follows: Part I
will demonstrate the importance of the analysis by surveying the
range of legal problems that reduce to the question of option de-
sign. Part II will present a conceptual account of option design that
demonstrates the basic relationship among the three fundamental
elements of an option premium, exercise price, and the length of
time that the option is open-and will explain how tradeoffs
among these three elements can affect the efficiency of the under-
lying transaction. Part III will relate those tradeoffs to the overall
incentive structure created by the contract; it will show how the
choice among option premium, exercise price, and option length
can influence the parties' incentives to perform, to take precau-
tions against breach, to mitigate damages if necessary, and to invest
in their relationship and in relation-specific assets. Part IV will dis-
cuss how the analysis presented in the prior two Parts relates to the
legal questions that motivated the initial inquiry, as well as to some
illustrative transactional problems?
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF OPTION CONTRACTS
In this Part, I survey the range of legal problems for which an
option-contract analysis is useful. Section A discusses the various
black letter doctrines under which contracts nominally labeled as
options are treated differently from contracts generally. Section B
relates option-contract analysis to the general area of contractual
2 See Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 47, 114 (1999); Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Sub-
stance in Contract Interpretation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 496, 512 (2004) [hereinafter
Katz, Economics of Form].
'This Article does not attempt to present a systematic account of option theory or
options pricing; several good introductions to those subjects are already available for
readers who wish to consult them. See, e.g., Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers,
Principles of Corporate Finance (7th ed. 2003); John Cox & Mark Rubinstein, Op-
tions Markets (1985); Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, Investment Under Un-
certainty (1994). The focus of this Article is on the use of options to promote efficient
contract design and to foster greater understanding of the principles of contract de-
sign among the lawyers and policymakers whose actions and decisions regulate con-
tractual planning.
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remedies. It discusses and critiques the familiar observation, com-
monly credited to Justice Holmes, that the default rule under
which the remedy for breach of contract is limited to monetary
damages in effect turns all contracts into option contracts, and then
extends this observation to a variety of specific doctrinal rules in
the remedial area. Finally, Section C shows how an option-based
perspective raises interesting practical questions about business
behavior and transactional planning, as well as about doctrinal ap-
plications.
A. Special Doctrinal Treatment of Option Contracts
1. Consideration and Mutuality
It is a basic principle of the common law that promises are gen-
erally not legally enforceable unless they are given in exchange for
consideration-some payment, performance, or counterpromise
that flows back to the promisor or his designee.4 While the precise
meaning and rationale of the consideration doctrine have long
been debated, one commonly accepted component of the concept
is the element of bargain-that is, promises should presumptively
be enforceable if they are made as part of a deliberate and arm's-
length economic exchange. On this conceptual account, most op-
tion contracts should qualify as bargains in that they are extended
as part of an exchange process and operate as one of the critical
terms and conditions of the exchange.
Traditional common law courts were nonetheless reluctant to
view an important set of option contracts-those with zero pre-
mium-as full-fledged exchanges. They reasoned that the holder of
such an option did not give anything to her grantor unless and until
the option was exercised. For example, in Wickham & Burton Coal
Co. v. Farmers' Lumber Co. the court refused to enforce an
agreement under which a seller of coal agreed with one of its cus-
tomers to furnish at a fixed price and over a fixed six-month term
whatever amount of coal the buyer wished to purchase, on the
grounds that the agreement neither required the buyer to pay to
'In order to avoid ambiguity when discussing generic option transactions, I adopt
the convention in this Article of referring to offerors or grantors of options ("op-
tionors") with male pronouns, offerees or grantees ("optionees") with female pro-
nouns, and contracting parties generally with neutral pronouns.
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keep this option open nor did it bind the buyer to any minimum
amount5 In the court's view, the fact that the buyer retained the
option to order no coal at all rendered any promise it made illusory
and hence insufficient to provide consideration.6 Similar results
were reached in cases in which one party retained an option to
terminate the contract at any time (since that party could if she
wished escape all liability by exercising her option)7 and in cases in
which buyers promised to purchase their requirements or sellers
promised to sell their entire output of a particular commodity
(since the ostensibly bound party could choose to have no re-
quirements or output during the relevant time frame).,
The evident fact that such promises arose out of arm's-length ex-
changes entered into for purposes of risk and incentive allocation,
however, was not lost on courts and commentators. Many strove to
find doctrinal limits on the optionee's discretion that would render
her promise other than illusory. In the famous case of Wood v.
Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, for instance, Judge Cardozo found con-
sideration by reading into an exclusive agency contract an implied
promise of best efforts on the part of the promisee. Similarly, other
courts have implied a duty to exercise discretion in good faith, as in
Mattei v. Hopper,1" where the purchase of a parcel of commercial
real estate was made subject to an independent broker obtaining
leases satisfactory to the buyer. Still others have stretched to find
consideration in contractual or statutory notice requirements, even
where those requirements did not substantially burden the op-
'179 N.W. 417 (Iowa 1920).
'Id. at 420.
'See, e.g., Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., 296 F. 693, 694 (5th
Cir. 1924) (holding that a licensing agreement granting the plaintiff the exclusive right
to manufacture "Orange Crush" under defendant's trademark was void for lack of
mutuality because the license contained a provision allowing the plaintiff to cancel at
any time).
8 See, e.g., Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory, 132 N.E. 148,
149 (N.Y. 1921) (holding that a contract whereby a glue factory agreed to sell to a
jobber his glue requirements at a certain price without any consideration paid by the
jobber and without any promise by him to take any glue lacked mutuality and was not
enforceable).
9118 N.E. 214, 215 (N.Y. 1917).
10 330 P.2d 625, 627 (Cal. 1958).
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tionee's exercise of discretion." On the statutory front, the Uni-
form Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") today implies a general duty of
good faith in the performance of all contracts within its scope and
imposes more specific duties of good faith to limit the discretion
that can be exercised under a requirements or output contract, 2 a
sales contract that leaves the price or other particulars of perform-
ance to be fixed by one of the parties," or an acceleration clause.'
Notwithstanding these developments, the illusory promise rule
remains part of black letter doctrine to this day. As Restatement(Second) of Contracts Section 77 provides: "A promise or apparent
promise is not consideration if by its terms the promisor or pur-
ported promisor reserves a choice of alternative performances
unless ... each of the alternative performances would have been
consideration if it alone had been bargained for."" There remains a
legally enforceable mechanism, however, for offerors who want to
bind themselves to a contract while leaving their offeree with full
discretion whether to go forward with the deal. Although the for-
mal device of nominal consideration has been generally discredited
as a method of creating contractual obligation, Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts Section 87(1) authorizes it for option contracts in
particular. 6 Similarly, in sales contracts, U.C.C. Section 2-205 al-
lows such "firm offers" to be made by a signed record but limits
" See, e.g., Lindner v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 252 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Ark.
1952) (holding that an oil company's option to cancel the lease of a filling station op-
erator upon ten days' notice did not qualify as an at-will termination provision, and
that at the very least the lessee was bound to pay rent for ten days, which constituted
sufficient consideration to support the finding of a contract between the lessor andlessee); Gurfein v. Werbelovsky, 118 A. 32, 33 (Conn. 1922) (holding that although abuyer retained the right to cancel an order before shipment, the seller's right to ship
any time within three months, existing for however short a time after acceptance, car-
ried with it the right to ship at the time of acceptance, and that this constituted suffi-
cient consideration to establish a valid contract).
'
2 U.C.C. § 2-306 (2004).
" Id. §§ 2-305(2), 2-311(1).
'4 Id. § 1-309.
'5 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 77 (1981).
16 Id. § 87(1) ("An offer is binding as an option contract if it (a) is in writing and
signed by the offeror, recites a purported consideration for the making of the offer,
and proposes an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable time; or (b) is made ir-
revocable by statute.").
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their enforceability to a period not to exceed ninety days. 7 Thus,
offerors who wish to bind themselves to zero premium options can
do so provided that the option does not extend over too long a
term and provided that they observe the requisite formalities.
From an economic viewpoint, the puzzling aspect of this doc-
trinal survey is neither that the courts held to formal accounts of
consideration in the face of the commercial reality of the underly-
ing deals, nor that it took so long to find a formal escape hatch.
Rather, it is why parties frequently found it in their interest to en-
ter into such arrangements, when by changing their deal slightly
they could have had a legally enforceable contract. To illustrate
more precisely, consider a firm offer that gives the offeree the op-
tion to purchase a promissory note for $500, with the option to be
exercised within no more than one year. This option is a very close
substitute for another option that sets the strike price at $450
rather than $500, but that also requires the offeree to pay $25 up-
front to hold the option open. Assuming that there is approxi-
mately a 50% chance that the option comes "into the money" (that
is, that it becomes worth exercising because the market price rises
above the strike price), the $25 down payment compensates for the
extra $50 of profit that the offeree will gain in the event that she
exercises the option.18
An option that is traded for a positive premium was and is fully
enforceable, subject to other possible defenses such as mistake or
unconscionability. Why didn't parties who wanted to make firm of-
7 U.C.C. § 2-205 (2004) ("An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed
record that by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for
lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable
time, but in no event may the period of irrevocability exceed three months. Any such
term of assurance in a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the
offeror.").
8 Of course, the reduction in strike price slightly increases the chance that the op-
tion will be worth exercising, so the expected value of the option rises by slightly more
than $25; the basic lesson is that the reduction in exercise price can be priced out up-
front. Similarly, if the parties did not want to alter the exercise price of the option,
they could increase its term, since the length of time that the option is open affects the
likelihood that it will at some point come into the money. Thus, a zero premium op-
tion to purchase a promissory note within one year, for instance, would be a good
substitute for a $25 option to purchase the same note at the same price within two
years, if the time extension increased by an additional 50% the probability that the
option comes into the money.
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fers simply collect payment from their offerees, and in exchange
for that payment sweeten the other terms of the exchange? One
possible answer, of course, is that they wanted to make such offers
but did not want to make them legally binding, but such an expla-
nation does not account for subsequent parties' use of the formal
devices established by U.C.C. Section 2-205 or Restatement Sec-
tion 87(1).
2. Offer and Acceptance
As the phrase "firm offer" indicates, option contracts also impli-
cate contract formation issues, as the question of revocability typi-
cally reduces to the question of whether an option has been
granted. And as with consideration, doctrinal treatment of this
question has evolved over the years. Case law and commentary
prior to the first Restatement of Contracts suggested, consistent
with a strictly formalistic view of consideration, that offers for uni-
lateral contracts could be revoked at any time before performance
was completed.19 The first Restatement moderated this position,
taking the view that an offeree who tenders or partially performs
the requested performance is entitled to enforce the offeror's
promise so long as she completes performance within a reasonable
time.' ° The second Restatement, in contrast, advances this right of
the offeree so that it begins at the onset of performance; it also ex-
plicitly labels the resulting obligation an option.21
9 See, e.g., Petterson v. Pattberg, 161 N.E. 428, 430 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that defen-
dant, who had promised to accept a cash payoff of a mortgage held on the plaintiff's
realty, revoked the promise as the plaintiff stood on defendant's doorstep ready to
tender cash in his pocket); I. Maurice Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral
Contracts, 26 Yale L.J. 136, 136-37 (1916) (presenting a notorious hypothetical in
which the defendant, who has promised to pay plaintiff $100 for crossing the Brook-
lyn Bridge, withdraws the offer once plaintiff has walked halfway across).
20 Restatement of Contracts § 45 (1932) ("If an offer for a unilateral contract is
made, and part of the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by the
offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of immediate
performance of which is conditional on the full consideration being given or tendered
within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein, within a reasonable
time." (emphasis added)).
21 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45(1) (1981) ("Where an offer invites an of-
feree to accept by rendering a performance and does not invite a promissory accep-
tance, an option contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited per-formance or tenders a beginning of it." (emphasis added)).
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The irrevocability of an option contract, however, is not its only
distinctive feature under the law of offer and acceptance. In con-
trast to ordinary offers, for instance, options remain open by de-
fault until their originally announced expiration date, even in the
case of an explicit rejection or counteroffer by the offeree, on the
theory that the optionee is entitled to enjoy the full speculative
value that she was promised.22 On the other hand, contract terms
governing the time and manner of option exercise are applied
strictly, in contrast to the more liberal treatment accorded to ordi-
nary acceptances. As the comments to Restatement Section 25 ex-
plain, "any relaxation of terms would substantively extend the op-
tion contract to subject one party to greater obligations than he
bargained for. '
Finally, the traditional distinction between unilateral and bilat-
eral contract comes down to the existence of an option; specifically,
a bilateral contract binds the offeree unconditionally to perform,
while a unilateral contract leaves her the option to choose whether
or not to perform. Legal commentators have generally recognized
that the doctrinal distinction serves this functional role, but they
have nonetheless vacillated over the years on the question of which
category of obligation should be presumptively favored.4 Contem-
porary doctrine muddies the waters by ostensibly making the legal
characterization of the obligation turn on the parties' intentions,
but then imposing presumptions that make whatever obligation ex-
ists begin at the earliest possible moment.2
22 See id. § 37 ("[T]he power of acceptance under an option contract is not termi-
nated by rejection or counter-offer, by revocation, or by death or incapacity of the of-
feror, unless the requirements are met for the discharge of a contractual duty."). For a
critique of the Restatement rule, see Michael J. Cozzillio, The Option Contract: Ir-
revocable Not Irrejectable, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 491 (1990).
23 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 25 cmt. d (1981).
24 Compare Restatement of Contracts § 31 (1932) (interpreting ambiguous offers as
offers for bilateral contracts), with Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 32 (1981) (al-
lowing an ambiguous offer to be accepted by either performance or a counter-
promise as the offeree chooses); see also U.C.C. § 2-206(a) (2004) ("[A]n offer to
make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any
medium reasonable in the circumstances."). The second Restatement even eschews
the use of the terms "unilateral contract" and "bilateral contract," because of "doubt
as to the utility of the distinction, often treated as fundamental, between the two
types." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 cmt. f (1981).
Compare Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 62(1) (1981) (beginning of per-
formance amounts to an acceptance by performance (hence a unilateral contract) in
21972004]
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Whether a given offer is interpreted as unilateral or bilateral,
however, and whether the law should impose a presumption in fa-
vor of one or the other, cannot be answered without having some
sense of why parties would use such arrangements and what trans-
actional purposes they serve. Giving the offeree a binding option
allows her to speculate at the offeror's expense and therefore only
makes economic sense when her valuation of that speculative op-
portunity exceeds his. But the Restatement does not tell us when
this is likely to be the case, and U.C.C. Article 2, true to its stan-
dard interpretative philosophy, tells us that the answer turns on an
all-things-considered examination of the circumstances. If we are
to cut through this thicket of doctrinal alternatives, we need a more
structured account of when and when not to infer-or from the
parties' viewpoint, to establish-an option contract.
3. Performance, Breach, and Damages
a. Anticipatory Repudiation
In ordinary contracts as interpreted under modern legal doc-
trine, promisors have a duty not to create unreasonable doubt
about their contractual performance, both because certainty of per-
formance is part of what the promisee has bargained for and be-
cause excessive doubt disrupts the promisee's ability to prepare for
performance and to make appropriate reliance investments. Ac-
cordingly, a party who repudiates a contractual promise in advance
of the time for performance, either by indicating an intention not
to perform or by undertaking an act that renders performance in-
feasible, breaches the contract, thus discharging his counterparty's
remaining duties and entitling her to bring an immediate action for
damages.26 Similarly, a party who does not go so far as to repudiate,
but who creates sufficient uncertainty about his future perform-
ance, entitles his counterparty to demand adequate assurance of
performance and, if reasonable, to suspend her own performance
cases where an offeror explicitly invites an offeree to choose between acceptance by
performance or by promise) and id. § 62(2) (such an acceptance also operates as a
promise to complete performance), with id. § 45(1) (where an offeror clearly requests
acceptance by performance, the offeror becomes bound as soon as the offeree tenders
or begins the invited performance but the offeree does not similarly become bound).26 See id. § 253. The analogous provision under sales law is U.C.C. § 2-610 (2004).
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in the meantime.' In this case, the request for assurances also en-
ables the insecure party to avoid wasteful reliance expenditures
and to begin to mitigate damages in the event that assurances are
not forthcoming.'
In the option-contract setting, however, the logical rationale of
the anticipatory repudiation and adequate assurances doctrines
does not apply. An optionee has no duty to go through with the
deal; on the contrary, she has bargained for the right to speculate,
which remains valuable to her until the last possible moment. Simi-
larly, the grantor of the option has not bargained for certainty, but
has instead agreed to bear whatever uncertainty results from the
optionee's exercise of discretion. But the substantive justifications
for these doctrines-the need to promote reliance investments in
cases where the contract is going to be performed, and the need to
encourage flexible and prompt mitigation in cases where it is not-
remain whether or not the contract is denoted an option.
b. Duty to Mitigate
In the usual case, a party who suffers a breach of contract is ex-
pected to take reasonable actions to mitigate losses-that is, to
seek out a substitute arrangement and to deduct the amounts so
earned from the damages payable on the original contract. Any
losses that could have been avoided by mitigation, furthermore,
cannot be recovered as part of the damages payable by the breach-
ing party. The mitigation principle is a fundamental principle of
contract law, one that is commonly justified on diverse normative
principles, including fairness (the aggrieved party owes a duty of
cooperation and ought not run up losses even at the expense of a
deliberate breacher), efficiency (it is wasteful to encourage the ag-
grieved party to run up losses for which she is the least-cost
avoider), and corrective justice (any losses that could have been
avoided by mitigation were caused by the aggrieved party and not
by the breacher).
In contracts where the promisor has bargained for an option on
the time or services of the promisee, however, the duty to mitigate
27 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-609 (2004).
See generally Richard Craswell, Insecurity, Repudiation, and Cure, 19 J. Legal
Stud. 399 (1990).
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does not apply. 29 For example, in a so-called "pay-or-play" con-
tract, common in the entertainment industry, the promisor prom-
ises either to employ the promisee for a given job or to pay an
equivalent salary." In a "take-or-pay" contract, common in extrac-
tive industries such as coal or natural gas, the promisor promises
either to take a given quantity of output or to pay for that quantity
even if none is taken.31 A promisor who makes such a promise and
then chooses the payment option cannot insist that the promisee
make other arrangements or deduct any amounts earned in the
event she does. The formal argument in favor of such a result is
that if the optionee exercises one of the options available to her
under the contract, no breach has occurred. No breach means that
no duty to mitigate on the part of either party ever arises.
Whether such a result makes sense in substantive terms depends,
of course, on whether it promotes efficiency, fairness, or some
other normative objective. There is some evidence that the doc-
trine accords with commercial practice; for instance, Professor
Goldberg finds that the "pay-or-play" contracts entered into be-
tween Hollywood studios and movie producers or directors typi-
cally provide that there is no obligation for the artist to mitigate
damages resulting from her removal from the project.32 A full ex-
planation, however, requires an account of why some contracting
parties would do away with the duty to mitigate while others would
not.
c. Liquidated Damages and Penalties
Structuring a contract as an option can also help the parties
evade the penalty doctrine, which provides that parties may not
contract for liquidated damages in an amount exceeding a fair es-
timate of the aggrieved party's lost expectation. Specifically, this
can be done by providing for an unconditional payment that is
characterized as the purchase of an option, which can subsequently
be exercised by tendering an additional sum. (The take-or-pay con-
29See Victor P. Goldberg, Bloomer Girl Revisited or How to Frame an Unmade
Picture, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1051, 1066-70.
3
'Id. at 1052, 1055.
3' See Scott E. Masten & Keith J. Crocker, Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Con-
tracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 1083 (1985).32 Goldberg, supra note 29, at 1070-72.
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tract is an extreme example of this arrangement, in which the addi-
tional sum is zero.) If the purchaser subsequently decides not to go
through with the transaction, she simply elects not to exercise the
option. As a result, there is no breach, and hence no opportunity
for the penalty doctrine to come into play.33
If the prepayment is characterized as a deposit or performance
bond rather than the purchase of an option, in contrast, the law will
limit the extent to which it can be made nonrefundable. For in-
stance, in sales contracts, U.C.C. Section 2-718 provides that a
breaching party is entitled to the return of any deposit she has
made to the extent that the deposit exceeds the aggrieved party's
compensable damages.34 And in the common law setting, the
breacher may have an analogous claim for restitution.35
Recent scholarship has called into question whether the penalty
doctrine can be justified on economic grounds.36 If these scholars
are right, it is desirable that there should exist a device that allows
the parties to evade the penalty doctrine. But if they are right, why
don't contracting parties use this device all the time? And if they
are not, why should legal doctrine provide this loophole?
B. Remedial Rules Generally
Even apart from the special treatment accorded to option con-
tracts in particular, the entire law of contract remedies is usefully
analyzed in terms of options because in the ordinary case breach of
contract gives rise only to a claim of monetary damages, not to spe-
cific performance. As Justice Holmes famously remarked:
" See Nat'l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 464 A.2d 546, 558
n.8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (declining to apply the penalty doctrine to take-or-pay
contract); accord Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1292 (7th Cir.
1985) (approving in dicta the immunity from the penalty doctrine enjoyed by take-or-
pay clauses).
U.C.C. § 2-718 (2004).3 3The restitution argument would be that the forfeited deposit results in unjust en-
richment because it puts the aggrieved party in a better position than contractual per-
formance would have done. But see Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131, 139-40 (1881);
Maxton Builders, Inc. v. lo Galbo, 493 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), aff'd, 502
N.E.2d 184, 189 (N.Y. 1986) (involving earnest money deposits in real estate transac-
tions treated as presumptively nonrefundable to the extent that they complied with
trade usage).
36 For a survey of arguments, see Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penal-
ties in Contracts, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 33 (2003).
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Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more
manifest than in the law of contract.... The duty to keep a con-
tract at common law means a prediction that you must pay dam-
ages if you do not keep it-and nothing else. If you commit a
tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a
contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the
promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But
such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of
those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the
law as they can.37
In option terminology, we can restate Holmes's point by saying
that the promisor holds a call option to buy her way out of the con-
tract by paying a strike price equal to the value of court-awarded
damages.
Holmes's option theory of contracts has been widely criticized
over the years by commentators who have argued that breaking a
promise is not merely a social inconvenience, but a deontological
wrong.38 Some of these critics have also attacked the modern-day
economic elaboration of Holmes's theory: the so-called theory of
efficient breach. But much of this criticism misses the mark, be-
cause not even the most uncompromising deontologist would ob-ject if the parties were explicitly to write Holmes's call option into
their contract. If they did, the party calling the option would not be
breaking any promise; rather, she would simply be exercising a
right freely and consensually granted to her by the promisee.
Whether breach of contract can be viewed as a wrong, accordingly,
depends on whether the parties have contracted with the intention
of incorporating such an option into their agreement.
As Professor Shavell has observed, the legal regime merely sets
up a default term for contracting when it establishes a rule of dam-
ages.39 Under a regime where specific performance is the nominal
default, as in some of the civil law systems of Europe, the parties
can contract around this default rule by writing a payment option
3 O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897).38 See, e.g., Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation
16 (1981); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1989).
3 Steven Shavell, Contracts, in 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and
the Law 436, 438 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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into their contract. Under the common law rule that makes expec-
tation damages the default, parties can in principle escape the de-
fault by writing in a different damages term or even a term calling
for specific enforcement. A deontological critic, however, should
have no reason for preferring one default rule to another. Absent
some substantive account of human flourishing that explains which
kind of agreements human beings should properly enter into and
that justifies interfering with their individual decisions in this re-
gard, respect for the parties' autonomy requires only that their
voluntary agreements should be enforced.' Accordingly, the aspect
of common law doctrine most vulnerable to attack on autonomy
grounds is not the default rule of expectation damages, but rather
those doctrines that impinge on the parties' freedom to contract
around this default rule by arranging for liquidated damages or
specific performance as they freely choose." Indeed, an efficiency-
based default rule arguably promotes party autonomy by adopting
a rule of interpretation that is likely to correspond to the way in
which most contracting parties actually would want their agree-
ment to be enforced. 2
o See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Prom-
ising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 528 (1989) (elaborating this defense of efficiency analysis
against the objections of deontological critics).Recent statutory innovations under the newly amended Article 2 of the U.C.C., if
adopted by the states, may have the effect of expanding the parties' contractual free-
dom in this way. The new version of § 2-710 extends to sellers the option, previously
available only to buyers, of collecting consequential damages in appropriate cases;
new § 2-716 directs courts to consider the parties' ex ante consent to specific perform-
ance as a factor in the decision whether to issue such an award; and new § 2-718
eliminates the requirements of difficulty of proving loss and inconvenience of obtain-
ing an adequate remedy for commercial parties seeking to enforce liquidated damages
clauses. U.C.C. §§ 2-710, 2-716, 2-718 (2004).
42 Professor Shavell writes:
This understanding of damage measures as a device to induce the behaviour
that the parties would have specified in more complete contracts sheds light on
the notion, held by many legal commentators, that contract breach is immoral,
as it constitutes the breaking of a promise. That belief is often incorrect, it is
submitted, and might fairly be considered to be the opposite of the truth. The
view that a contract breach is the breaking of a promise overlooks the point that
the contract that is breached is generally an incomplete contract, and that the
breach is what the parties want and would have specified in a complete contract.
In the example of the simple incomplete contract calling for a desk to be pro-
duced, the seller who finds that his production cost would be [substantially
higher than the buyer's losses from non-delivery] will commit breach under the
expectation measure. But in so doing, he will be acting precisely as would have
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From an options perspective, then, the effect of remedial doc-
trine is simply to set the terms of the promisor's inherent call op-
tion. A legal regime or individual agreement that awards higher or
more extensive damages will raise the option's strike price, making
it more costly for the promisor to exercise the option and less likely
that she will do so. As with all options traded at arm's length, how-
ever, the change in the strike price will affect the ex ante exchange
value of the option and hence the price at which the parties are
willing to enter into the contract initially.43 Changes in the damage
rule, accordingly, result in changes in the structure of the call op-
tion embedded in every contract, and in the risk and incentive
properties associated with it.
The same is true of the rules that set the times when a breaching
party is deemed to have breached and when damages are to be
measured. The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation, for instance,
shortens the term of the promisor's option to breach and pay dam-
ages by forcing her in certain circumstances to exercise that option
well before the scheduled time of performance. Similarly, the time
at which the promisee's damages are measured in repudiation cases
determines whether or not she gets an option to speculate against
the contract. If damages are measured at the time of repudiation,
as they are under U.C.C. Section 2-713 when a seller repudiates an
obligation to deliver goods," the parties' positions are closed out
immediately and there is no further speculative opportunity for ei-
ther party. If damages are not measured until the time of perform-
ance, however, as they are under U.C.C. Section 2-708 when a
buyer repudiates an obligation to purchase, 5 the aggrieved seller
receives an option to enforce the contract if prices move against
her, but can forego enforcement in the event that prices move in
her favor. The positive value of this option leads to an associated
increase in the seller's expected damages from breach.46
been set out in a complete contract, and it is that contract which is best re-
garded as the promise between the parties that ought to be kept.
Shavell, supra note 39, at 439.
" See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J.
Lefal Stud. 139 (1995).U.C.C. § 2-713 (2004).
"' Id. § 2-708.
46 See Thomas H. Jackson, "Anticipatory Repudiation" and the Temporal Element
of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospec-
Finally, a similar interpretation can be given to the various doc-
trines that regulate the so-called "self-help" remedies of contract
law-rejection, revocation, the demand for adequate assurance,
suspension of one's performance, and rescission-because such
remedies are all optional on the aggrieved party's part. These rules
affect the value of the promisor's option just as the rules governing
monetary remedies do. For instance, the sales law doctrine of ac-
ceptance, which limits the period of time during which a buyer is
entitled to reject non-conforming goods, reduces the value of her
option to reject. This limitation thus affects both the seller's incen-
tive to perform and the ex ante price of the goods that are traded.
II. A THEORETICAL ACCOUNT OF OPTION DESIGN
The preceding discussion may have persuaded the reader that
the option element in contracting is important and even pervasive,
but it raises more questions than it answers. In order to begin to
address these questions, this Part develops a simple model of the
option contract that shows how the basic aspects of an option re-
late to and can be traded off against each other.
A. Three Essential Terms: Option Premium, Strike Price, and
Option Life
The model is simple, and I have already hinted at its basic intui-
tion in my discussion of some of the foregoing examples. Specifi-
cally, I model the idealized option contract as consisting of three
main terms: the option premium (denoted as P), which is the un-
conditional amount that the optionee must pay upfront in order to
acquire the right to exercise the option; the exercise or strike price
(denoted as S), which is the amount that the optionee must pay
conditionally in the event that she chooses to exercise her rights,
tive Nonperformance, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 69, 103-04 (1978) (explaining the relationship
between time of measuring damages and the expected value of damages and criticiz-
ing the rule of U.C.C. § 2-708 on the grounds that it gives the aggrieved seller an un-
bargained and inefficient speculative opportunity). Revisions to U.C.C. § 2-708, re-
cently promulgated by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law but not yet adopted as the law of any state,
would eliminate the current asymmetric treatment of buyers and sellers in this regard,
measuring damages at repudiation for either party, in accordance with Jackson's ar-
gument. See U.C.C. § 2-708(1)(b) cmt. 4 (2004).
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and the option life (denoted as T), which is the period of time for
which the option remains open. A firm offer extended under
U.C.C. Section 2-205, for instance, would have a P equal to zero, a
T equal to ninety days, and an S equal to whatever price at which
the offeror stood ready to sell.
Similarly, a prepaid airline reservation that requires the passen-
ger to charge a $400 ticket to her credit card at the time the reser-
vation is issued, but that allows her the option to reschedule her
trip to a later date with a change penalty of $100, gives the passen-
ger a call option on the reserved seat with P=$100, S=$300, and T
equal to the time between the making of the reservation and the
latest time that the airline is willing to credit the remaining value of
the ticket to another flight. The $100 payment is the unconditional
premium, P, because the passenger must pay it whether she exer-
cises the option or not; and $300 is the strike price, S, because if she
actually decides to take this flight, she loses the opportunity to ap-
ply the $300 credit to a later trip. (This calculation assumes that the
value of applying the $300 to a later trip is actually worth $300,
which it would be to a passenger who travels frequently and will
use the credit in ordinary course. If the value of the credit is only$250, for instance, because there is a one in six chance that she will
never rebook on this particular airline, then the option premium, P,
equals $150 and the strike price, S, equals $250.4")
As the airline example illustrates, the designation of P as the
"up-front" premium is intended merely to indicate that its payment
is unconditional. It is possible for P to be financed on seller credit,
so long as the seller has a reliable way to collect in the event that
the optionee chooses to exit. Credit cards are often used as such a
collection mechanism. In the case of vacation deposits described
17 Alternatively, we could characterize the ticket not as granting a call option on the
right to keep this particular reservation, but as an outright sale of the trip, bundled
with a put option in which the passenger holds the right to force the airline to buy
back the reservation in exchange for a credit to be used on another flight. In this case
we would have to determine what fraction of the payment is properly allocated to the
sale of the ticket and what fraction is properly allocated to the sale of the put option.
Such a determination would require us to know the going price for an unconditional
sale of a seat, a fact that the hypothetical description in the text does not disclose. The
two characterizations are equivalent in economic terms; this is an instance of a feature
of options that financial economists label "put-call parity." See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll,
Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 61, 72 (2002). Accordingly, we are
free to choose one characterization or the other at our convenience.
below, 48 for instance, many innkeepers will agree to wait to submit
a charge against the customer's account until the actual date of the
reservation if they are given the contractual right to make the
charge in the event that the customer cancels her reservation. Simi-
larly, a seller could collect a larger deposit than she plans to keep,
refunding part of the excess following cancellation. The actual tim-
ing of payment is a secondary complication that I abstract from in
this discussion; the variables P, S, and T, accordingly, should be in-
terpreted in terms of the parties' actual opportunity costs from en-
tering into and exercising rights under an option contract, rather
than the payments that may happen to flow between the parties at
any particular point in time.49
B. The Relationship Among Option Premium, Strike Price, and
Option Life
In a competitive market, or indeed in any arm's-length ex-
change, these three terms of the option contract will stand in a
regular relationship with one another. Specifically, the option pre-
mium, P, and the option life, T, will vary directly with each other,
so that an increase in T will be associated with an increase in P.
Similarly, the strike price, S, and the option life, T, will vary di-
rectly, so that an increase in T will be associated with an increase in
S. The option premium, P, and the strike price, S, however, will
vary inversely-an increase in S will lead to a decrease in P, and
vice versa.
These relationships among P, S, and T follow directly from a cal-
culation of the economic value and economic cost of an option.
More specifically, the expected value of an option to its holder,
which I denote as E(V), depends on the possible distribution of
values, V, that the underlying good or service might take on, and
,' See infra Section IV.B.1.
In addition, the framework is general enough to encompass contracts that we
would in common parlance describe as unconditional. An idealized unconditional sale
of a widget for one dollar that is specifically performable in equity, for instance, can
be interpreted as carrying along with it an exit option with T=O (the buyer has no time
after entering into the sale to change her mind) or S=oo (the price of refusing to buy,
and hence resisting the enforcement power of the chancellor, is infinite). In practice,
even unconditional contracts are less than fully enforceable, so that S may be high but
not infinite, or T may be very small but not zero.
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on the probabilities associated with each of those possible values. If
the underlying good turns out to be worth more than the strike
price, S, at any time during the period that the option is open, the
optionee will want to exercise the option and will in this case re-
ceive net gains V-S. (It is conventional to refer to this situation by
saying that the option is "in the money.") If the underlying good
turns out to be worth less than the strike price, S, for the entire op-
tion term, the optionee will prefer to let the option expire, and will
receive ex post net gains of zero. The total expected value of the op-
tion thus equals the discounted value, averaged over all possible reali-
zations of V and over the time horizon, T, of the greater of V-S and
zero." To take an extreme example, on the one hand, an option that
one knows one will never exercise is worthless. On the other hand,
an option that one might want to exercise always has positive
value, even if the probability of exercise is very low.
Calculating the expected cost of an option to the optionor is
slightly more complicated. Denote the value that the optionor at-
taches to the underlying good as W. This value, W, need not be
identical to the optionee's value, V, although in general the two
parties' values will be positively correlated in the statistical sense
for most ordinary commodities. In all cases where the optionee
elects to exercise the option (that is, in all cases where V>S), the
optionor will lose an amount equal to W-S (that is, he will lose his
own use-value, W, but will receive the strike price, S, as compensa-
tion). Note that it is possible for the optionee's decision to exercise
the option to make both parties better off, if S is sufficiently high
or W is sufficiently low. In all cases where the optionee elects to
pass on the option, the optionor will lose zero. Thus the total ex-
pected cost of the option, denoted as E(W), equals the discounted
value, over the time horizon, T, and over all possible realizations of
V where V>S, of the greater of W-S and zero.
In any arm's-length exchange, and certainly in a competitive
market, the premium, P, paid for an option should be positively re-
lated to both expected value and expected cost, and in general will
lie in a range bounded by the two if they diverge. But expected
" Risk-averse parties will discount these possible outcomes in proportion to their
distaste for variation in their incomes. I am ignoring this complication for the present
discussion.
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value will vary directly with the option term, T, and inversely with
the strike price, S. Decreases in S will raise E(V) by making the ex-
ercise of the option more attractive to the optionee for any particu-
lar realization of V, and by making it more likely in marginal cases
that V will exceed S so that the option will be in the money. In-
creases in T will raise E(V) by making it more likely that at some
point during the option term, the optionee's valuation, V, will ac-
tually exceed the strike price, S." The optionor can therefore keep
the option equally attractive to the optionee by adjusting P, S, and
T according to this relationship.
The relationship between E(W), S, and T is more complicated
because of the possibility that the optionor's valuation, W, can fall
below S, so that the optionor prefers ex post for the optionee to
exercise the option. 2 This analysis is simplified, however, if we ob-
serve that the parties will never want to choose an S in the range
where E(W) varies directly with S, because by reducing S and rais-
ing P, both optionor and optionee can be made better off. (The in-
crease in P and decrease in S necessarily make the optionor better
off, and given the aforementioned relationship between S and
E(V), for any decrease in S we can always find some increased
value of P that leaves the optionee no worse off than under the
previous contract, and possibly better off.) Thus, in the range of
"' More formally: For any given random process that generates values of V over
time, there is some probability, p0 , that the option comes into the money (that is, that
V>S) at some point between now and a given subsequent time, t0. Suppose that this
does not happen-an event that occurs with probability 1-p0. Then if the option life is
extended to a later time, t0+t1 , there is an additional probability, p,, that the option
comes into the money at some time between t. and t1. Accordingly, the total chance
that the option is in the money at some point between t, and t1 equals p0+p,(1-p,).
52 Consider first the relationship between E(W) and S. A decrease in S has two pos-
sibly offsetting effects on E(V). First, it will raise the optionor's cost, W-S, for any
particular realization of V. This "price effect" clearly increases the overall expected
cost, E(V). The decrease in S, however, will also increase the chance that the optionee
wishes to exercise (the "quantity effect"). If, in those marginal cases affected by the
decrease, the value of W-S is positive so that the optionor prefers the optionee not to
exercise, then the quantity effect also increases the expected cost of the option. If,
however, the value of W-S is negative in those marginal cases affected by the de-
crease, then the quantity effect offsets the price effect and could in some cases lead to
an overall reduction in E(W). Note that the relationship between S and E(W) is more
likely to be positive when S is high, because then the option will rarely be in the
money, and the quantity effect will dominate the price effect. When S is low, in con-




values among which the parties would actually want to choose,
E(W) and S must be inversely related. Similarly, while there may
be values of the option life, T, such that T varies inversely with
E(W),53 the parties will never want to choose a T in that range of
values, because by raising both T and P simultaneously, both op-
tionor and optionee can be made better off. Thus, in the range of
values among which the parties would actually want to choose,
E(W) and T will be directly related.
Finally, while I do not explicitly incorporate such factors into my
analysis below, it is worth noting that exogenous market conditions
and other aspects of the underlying exchange-such as the market
rate of interest and the level of price volatility associated with the
underlying commodity-will also affect the relationship among P,
S, and T. In contracts where the payment of the premium is de-
layed until the optionee decides whether to exercise, a relatively
high interest rate will benefit the optionee and cost the optionor by
increasing the value of float that is extended. To compensate, the
parties will have to increase the strike price, S, for any given level
of premium, P. Similarly, a commodity that is subject to significant
price fluctuations is more likely, given any particular values of S
and T, to wind up in the money, and so an option to trade that
commodity must, in an arm's-length exchange, be associated with a
higher option premium, P. This is why we do not typically observe
zero premium firm offers extended in ordinary commodities or se-
curities markets, as the market value of such offers is strictly posi-
tive due to the expected variation in future price. In the discussion
below, I abstract from these concerns for reasons of expositional
simplicity; but as a general matter, the reader should understand
that increases in interest rates or market volatility will have a quali-
tatively similar effect to increases in the time horizon, T. 4
In what follows, I also abstract from the further complication
that in bilateral contracts where both parties have promised to per-
5' This would be the case if an extension of the option term, T, led to an increase in
the chance that the optionee would exercise, and the optionor wanted to increase this
chance because his valuation, W, was likely to be less than the strike price, S, for this
range of T.
4 A longer time horizon means that the discounted value of receiving funds at the
expiration of the option period is reduced; this is equivalent to an increase in the in-
terest rate. Similarly, with a longer time horizon there will be more opportunity for
prices to fluctuate; this is operationally equivalent to an increase in volatility.
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form, there are actually two options at work in that the buyer can
escape the contract by paying the seller's expectation damages and
the seller can also escape the contract by paying the buyer's expec-
tation damages.5 To consider symmetric options would needlessly
complicate the exposition of my argument, however, and once its
basic intuition is understood, the reader should be able to extend
its logic to the bilateral case in straightforward if tedious fashion.
C. Efficient Option Design
Given this functional relationship among P, S, and T, there exists
a continuous range of possible option contracts among which the
parties might choose, ranging from those with low P and high S to
those with high P and low S, and from those with low P and T to
those with high P and T. Similarly, the parties can choose between
nominally unconditional contracts (those with T=0 and S=oo, and
some value of P) and a continuum of more or less equivalent op-
tion contracts (those with T>0 and S<oo, and a somewhat higher
value of P). How, then, can and should the parties choose among
these possible contracts?
Phrased in the most general terms, the answer stems from the
fact that while both the optionee's expected value E(V) and the
optionor's expected cost E(W) vary directly with the option life, T,
and inversely to the strike price, S, they may vary at different rates.
If so, the parties will differ in their willingness to trade one of these
terms off against another, and there will be mutual profit in a con-
tract that adjusts terms efficiently between them. For instance,
suppose that extending the life of the option by six months would
increase the optionee's expected value by $500 and would increase
the optionor's expected cost by only $200. In that case it would be
efficient to extend the option life, and we would expect that in an
arm's-length exchange the parties would have every incentive to do
SO.
Such an abstract answer, however, does not explain why the par-
ties' willingness to trade off option premium, option life, and strike
"' Indeed, in cases where a contracting party decides to exit the deal, his counter-
party's economic losses will include the lost value of her own exit option. See Alexan-
der J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Timing Problems in Contract Breach Decisions,
41 J.L. & Econ. 163, 166 (1998).
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price might differ in actual transactions. Accordingly, the following
Part of this Article grounds such tradeoffs in the overall incentive
structure created by the contract. As we will see, the reason why
one party might place relatively high value on a particular element
of an option turns on a variety of transactional factors, including
incentives to perform and to take precautions against breach, the
value of relation-specific investments, and the distribution of in-
formation between the parties.
III. DETERMINANTS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN OPTIONS
TRADING
For purposes of organizing the analysis of this Part, it is useful to
divide the various reasons why parties might wish to choose one
option over another into three categories: efficiency considera-
tions, nonefficiency considerations, and mixed considerations. Such
a taxonomy is necessary if we are interested in investigating the
appropriate legal treatment of option contracts, because if the par-
ties' choices are motivated primarily by efficiency considerations,
then absent some important countervailing public value, the law
should defer to those choices and enforce the contract as written. If
option design is instead driven by nonefficiency considerations
such as a seller's desire to gain market power or to foreclose com-
petition, nonenforcement and perhaps affirmative regulation of
contracting behavior is in order. We start with nonefficiency con-
siderations, not because they are necessarily more likely to moti-
vate such transactions, but because they are somewhat more
straightforward to explain and analyze.
A. Nonefficiency Considerations
1. Bounded Rationality
The psychological literature on economic behavior has shown
that individual human beings engaged in economic exchange do
not in fact always act as the idealized maximizers of neoclassical
economic theory but in many instances follow heuristic rules of
thumb when making decisions or are subject to imperfect cognitive
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procedures when processing information. 6 As a result, choices be-
tween economic alternatives can be sensitive to the way in which
those choices are framed.
Such factors could influence parties' choices between the three
variables, P, S, and T, if they affect people's perceptions of or atti-
tudes toward those variables disproportionately. For example, one
fairly robust finding of the behavioral economics literature is that
people tend to give more decisional weight to factors that are more
salient or memorable to them. It is plausible that for some option-
ees, the up-front payment, P, may be more salient than the subse-
quent exercise price, S, especially if the initial payment must be
paid out of pocket rather than financed. If so, parties designing the
option will have an incentive to back load the total payments under
the option, lowering P and raising S past the point that would oth-
erwise be transactionally efficient. A similar effect would be pro-
duced if people's inability to resist immediate temptation led them
to discount future costs and benefits at a rate that exceeded their
long-run relative value-a phenomenon sometimes labeled "hy-
perbolic discounting."57
Of course, in order for this factor to distort the choice among P,
S, and T, the two parties to the exchange would have to be un-
equally subject to it, because just as it is especially salient for the
optionee to have to make an unconditional payment of P and espe-
cially tempting to put off the pain by back loading part of the total
cost into the subsequent strike price, S, it is especially salient and
tempting for the optionor to receive that payment, P, rather than
waiting until some future time at which he might or might not re-
ceive S. In cases where one party is more sophisticated than the
other or more able to invoke procedures that rationalize its deci-
sionmaking, however, we would expect the sophisticated actor to
56 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 18-20
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1476-77 (1998).
" See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. Econ. 443,
445-46 (1997); Richard H. Thaler & George Loewenstein, Intertemporal Choice, in
Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life
92, 96-98 (1992). A less formal account of the phenomenon can be found in Jon El-
ster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality 71 (1979).
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design the option so as to delay its benefits under the option while
accelerating the benefits of its less sophisticated counterparty.
A similar phenomenon might occur not because of bounded ra-
tionality as such, but because of imperfect information. A buyer of-
fered an option contract might have better information about the
up-front payment, P, than about the strike price, S, (for example,
hotel and airline rates are typically published in generally available
schedules or tourist books, while their cancellation policies are less
widely advertised). A traveler who hears about the price of a par-
ticular room or flight, but who lacks information about the cancel-
lation penalty, will reasonably assume that this seller's cancellation
policy is the same as that of most other sellers and make a purchase
decision on that basis. The seller's incentive under such an infor-
mational structure, however, is to debase the latent terms and im-
prove the patent terms of the exchange as much as possible." In
such cases, there is a colorable case for legal rules, such as the illu-
sory promise rule and the limits on liquidated damages, that push
parties toward providing more unconditional compensation in the
form of P, and less conditional compensation in the form of S-but
only if we think that regulators have the ability to choose the
tradeoffs more efficiently than an unregulated market.
2. Market Exclusion
The bounded rationality/imperfect information story sketched in
the previous Section explains why parties might disproportionately
back load compensation by reducing the option premium, P, while
inflating the strike price, S. It is also possible, however, that they
would wish to do the reverse and front load the payment for anti-
competitive purposes. Such a strategy is effective because an op-
tionee who has already paid most of the price of a good up-front as
an option premium, and who needs only to pay a small additional
balance in order to get the good, will be much less likely to switch
to a competitor who enters the market after the option premium
has been paid. Setting up exchanges in the form of prepaid options,
58 See Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory
and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 215, 288-89 (1990); Avery Katz,
Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts, 21 RAND J.
Econ. 518, 525-28 (1990).
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or more generally, front loading payment to a greater extent than
would otherwise be profitable, may be a way of excluding competi-
tors from the market. Several economic commentators have shown
how liquidated damages clauses can be used in this way,59 and the
traditional non-Chicago antitrust account of resale price mainte-
nance is also based in part on this concern.' Recent work on con-
sumer "lock-in" in imperfectly competitive markets has also shown
that this could be a more general phenomenon.6"
In principle, the anticompetitive pricing of options contracts
could justify some form of regulation under the antitrust laws.
Whether this possibility justifies any particular legal policy or pre-
sumption in the area of contract doctrine is less clear. Courts decid-
ing contracts cases are unlikely to possess information sufficient to
judge whether anticompetitive effects on third parties outweigh the
benefits of option arrangements to the contracting parties. More-
over, such third parties would lack standing to challenge such terms
in the contract law setting. As the recent literature on liquidated
damage clauses has shown, the individual consumer who enters
into a lock-in arrangement benefits from the lock-in, since in order
to induce the consumer's agreement, the seller with market power
will in general share some of the gains from exclusion with the con-
sumer." Absent the emergence of an actual competitor with whom
the consumer wishes to deal or some other independent reason she
wishes to exit from the relationship, the consumer will have little
incentive to challenge the anticompetitive clause.
'
9 See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 Am.
Econ. Rev. 388, 388-92 (1987); Tai-Yeong Chung, On the Social Optimality of Liqui-
dated Damage Clauses: An Economic Analysis, 8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 280, 283-89
(1992); Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately
Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotia-
tion, 26 RAND J. Econ. 180, 183-86, 195-96 (1995).
6 See, e.g., 8 Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis
of Antitrust Principles 1604 (2d ed. 2004); Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discount-
ers: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 Geo. L.J.
1492-93 (1983).
61 See, e.g., Paul Klemperer, Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs:
An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and In-




Finally, contracting parties may alter the structure of their op-
tion contracts in order to take advantage of arbitrage possibilities
created by other regulatory regimes to which they are subject. A
prominent illustration is provided by the widespread practice of tax
planning. Under the Internal Revenue Code, similar transactions
can be taxed differently depending on whether they are structured
as options or unconditional obligations.63 Much creative work in the
tax area in recent years, both by practitioners and by scholars, has
focused on the arbitrage possibilities left open by tax law, and how
best to deal with those possibilities. Similarly, disparate accounting
treatment of options may lead parties wishing to improve the ap-
pearance of their financial condition to use the option form to shift
funds between current and future income and expenses." A third
example is provided by the privileged treatment of leases under
U.C.C. Article 9 and the federal bankruptcy code. A dispropor-
tionate amount of litigation has occurred over the issue of whether
an equipment lease with an option to purchase or renew at a favor-
able price at the end of the lease term amounts in substance to ei-
ther a sale, subject to U.C.C. Article 9's filing requirements and to
the automatic stay imposed when the lessee files for bankruptcy, or
a "true lease" that is outside the scope of Article 9 and free from
any claim of a bankruptcy trustee.65 This Article does not attempt
to provide any analysis of such issues, except to observe that they
provide a common reason for structuring options in one way or an-
other and that they can in general lead to option contracts that are
designed inefficiently from the viewpoint of maximizing social
63For instance, parties to an option contract do not generally realize gain or loss
upon the receipt or payment of an option premium, instead deferring realization until
the optionee's contract rights have either been exercised or expire. The analogous
transaction set up as an outright sale, in contrast, is treated as a realization event. See
generally Bruce Kayle, Realization Without Taxation? The Not-So-Clear Reflection
of Income From an Option to Acquire Property, 48 Tax L. Rev. 233 (1993).
' Similarly, disparate accounting treatment of options may lead to parties wishing to
improve their apparent financial condition to use the option form to shift funds be-
tween current income and assets, or between expenses and liabilities. See David M.
Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Com-
patibility, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440,454 (2000).
65 See, e.g., In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982).
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value or even of maximizing the non-arbitrage gains from ex-
change.
B. Efficiency Considerations
What, then, are the efficiency reasons for parties to trade off op-
tion premium, strike price, and option term in a particular way?
There are several possible reasons that I classify in two categories:
risk allocation and incentives.
1. Differential Beliefs About the Future or Differential Risk Aversion
Most simply and straightforwardly, parties often engage in
speculative exchange when they have different beliefs about what
the future will hold. Trading options and other financial instru-
ments can then be a way of betting on the future and hedging
against the risk of other events. This is, indeed, the main motiva-
tion for the market in purely financial options, where parties bet on
price movements of commodities and other underlying fundamen-
tal assets. Most standard accounts of finance markets view such
trading as a socially desirable mechanism for sharing information
and minimizing risk through financial diversification. To the extent
that option contracts are motivated by such speculative concerns, a
similar normative analysis will apply.
Similarly, the design and pricing of options may be motivated by
differences in risk aversion. When an option is sold, the seller re-
ceives an unconditional payment and the buyer receives a risky as-
set that has positive value if her private valuation, V, exceeds the
strike price, S, and zero value otherwise. Under many circum-
stances, the parties may differ in their willingness to hold this par-
ticular risk; for instance, the optionor may be relatively immune to
risk because of the size of his portfolio or the frequency with which
he trades, so that it is profitable for him to insure the optionee.
Such a rationale applies in both purely financial settings and the
context of real contractual exchange alike, and it may explain why
large sellers are willing to offer requirements contracts and large
buyers such as grain elevators are willing to offer output contracts.
To the extent that risk aversion and the value of insurance vary
over time and over particular ranges of potential asset values, they
can explain not only why parties enter into options, but why they
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might trade off option premium, strike price, and term in a particu-
lar way. For example, a seller may be willing to insure the risk that
the buyer's valuation for the good being exchanged falls below
some very low level (that is, to the point where the purpose of the
contract would be frustrated) because this risk is low and is likely
to be buyer-specific. He would not be willing to insure the risk that
the buyer's valuation falls only moderately, however, because this
risk has greater probability and is more likely to be the result of
general market shifts. Optimal risk allocation would then require
the seller to bear the former portion of risk but not the latter. 6
2. Ex Post Incentives
Risk and speculative motives help explain the existence of op-
tions trading in both financial and nonfinancial markets. More in-
teresting from the viewpoint of contract theory, however, are a set
of factors that go to the basic incentives of the parties to undertake
costly efforts that will increase the expected surplus from their ex-
change. Such factors are not of prime importance in financial op-
tions, where the parties are small relative to the market and are
typically not in a position to affect the relevant risks, but they are
fundamental in the ordinary contractual setting. In this regard, op-
tions can affect the parties' incentives to perform, to take precau-
tions against breach, or to make reliance investments in their rela-
tionship.
Specifically, an option separates the incentives to manage upside
and downside risk and splits those incentives between the contract-
ing parties. Buying an option gives the buyer incentives to invest in
actions that increase upside risk or that are valuable in the event
that such risk materializes because in that instance the buyer will
want to exercise the option, at which point the underlying asset and
all the costs and benefits associated with it will belong to her. It is
on this precise logic that executive stock options are claimed to im-
" Cf. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doc-
trines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Legal Stud. 83 (1977) (using simi-
lar risk aversion story to explain impracticability and frustration doctrines of contract
law).
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prove the incentives of corporate officers to act in ways that in-
crease the market value of the firm.67
The difference between an option and an outright sale in this re-
gard is that the seller of an option retains the incentives to invest in
actions that are valuable in the event of downside risk, because in
that event the option will not be exercised and the optionor will
remain the owner.' Thus, options will be economically advanta-
geous if the parties have some comparative advantage in managing
the different types of risk-for instance, if the seller's actions are
more important in ensuring that the underlying asset satisfies some
basic standard of merchantability, while the buyer's actions are
more important in maximizing either the potential resale value of
the underlying good or its synergistic value when combined with
other complementary assets.
Additionally, options will be a useful incentive device if the op-
tionee has limited available funds or faces a high cost of liquidity.
The price necessary to acquire an option will usually be substan-
tially less than the cost of buying the underlying asset outright, so
the optionee can more easily afford it. On the other hand, the po-
tential for upside risk may provide almost as strong a motivation
for the optionee to act efficiently, especially if the parties think that
downside risk is low. In such circumstances, options are a more ef-
ficient way to provide high-powered incentives than outright sales.
The incentive effects of options have been recognized and ap-
plied in specific contexts by a number of contributors to the law
and economics literature, but their general implications for con-
tract law have not been drawn out. For instance, in his well-known
article on the problem of providing multiple parties to a transac-
tion with simultaneous incentives to take appropriate precautions
against loss (what he calls "double responsibility at the margin"),
'
7 See, e.g., David Yermack, Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effec-
tively?, 39 J. Fin. Econ. 237, 242-47 (1995) (discussing the incentive rationale for ex-
ecutive stock options). But see Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751
(2002) (criticizing incentive argument for executive stock options and arguing that the
prevalence of such compensation arrangements is better explained by managerial
power and rent extraction).
68 This division of incentives is a feature of both put and call options-the only dif-




Professor Cooter identifies the call option as one of the standard
legal devices that can be used to accomplish such double responsi-
bility.69 The underlying intuition for his argument is that if the op-
tion is properly priced, the optionor will want to take optimal pre-
cautions to guard against the event that the optionee fails to
exercise the option, and the optionee will want to take optimal
precautions to make the most of performance because she antici-
pates that once the optionor has taken precautions, she will then
want to exercise the option. ° In a similar spirit, Professors N61deke
and Schmidt have shown how options can be used to solve the
problem of efficient promisee reliance,7' Professors Edlin and
Hermalin have shown how options can be used to promote effi-
cient relational investment,72 and Professors Masten and Crocker
have shown in particular how take-or-pay contracts-which as we
have seen amount in substance to an option contract-help im-
prove relational incentives in the natural gas industry.73
The foregoing account explains why contracting parties would
want to use options, but how does it explain the way in which they
choose between the basic elements of option premium, strike price,
and option life? The answer is straightforward and can be ex-
plained as follows. Consider a proposed option contract with given
values of P, S, and T, and imagine a marginal change in T that
would increase P and decrease S. Such a change would marginally
shift incentives to the optionee (and away from the optionor) by
increasing the chance that the optionee will want to exercise the
option. This shift is desirable if the marginal value to the contract
of the optionee's incentives is greater than the marginal value of
the optionor's incentives.
Similarly, imagine a marginal change in the option's terms that
would increase both P and T. This change would also increase the
" Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution,
73 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
70 Id. at 3-4, 22-23.
71 Georg Noldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A So-
lution to the Hold-up Problem, 26 RAND J. Econ. 163 (1995); Georg N61deke &
Klaus Schmidt, Sequential Investments and Options to Own, 29 RAND J. Econ. 633
(1998).
72 Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, Contract Renegotiation and Options in
Agency Problems, 16 J.L. Econ. & Org. 395, 404-09 (2000).3 Masten & Crocker, supra note 31, at 1084-88.
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chance that the optionee will exercise the option and thus would
marginally shift incentives from the optionor to the optionee. It
would also have the effect of providing additional incentives for
the optionor to take precautions against low-value realizations for
a longer period of time. (For a concrete example, consider a re-
tailer that offers a money-back guaranty, and thus effectively
commits itself to provide post-sales services or technical support in
order to induce the buyer not to take advantage of the guaranty.)
In this way, the parties can settle on the efficient option for their
specific situation by adjusting P, S, and T until the marginal value
of enhancing the optionor's incentives in each dimension is exactly
balanced by the marginal value of enhancing the optionee's incen-
tives.
C. Mixed Explanations
The above discussion suggests some fairly unambiguous recom-
mendations for public policy regarding option contracts: To the ex-
tent that the choice to use an option contract and the tradeoff
among its fundamental terms is motivated by efficiency concerns,
the courts should enforce those contracts, notwithstanding tradi-
tional doctrinal barriers such as the illusory promise rule or the
penalty doctrine. Similarly, when determining whether ambiguous
contracts are options or not (for example, in distinguishing be-
tween an offer for a bilateral contract and an offer for a unilateral
contract), courts should keep in mind the substantive economic
factors that go to whether an option would be efficient in the par-
ticular setting. To the extent that the use of options is driven by in-
efficient motivations such as the desire to exclude competitors or
to extract excess profits from boundedly rational consumers, courts
should not defer to the parties' private decisions. What makes
these problems harder and more interesting is that there are also
motivations for using option contracts that are neither clearly effi-
cient nor clearly inefficient. What public regulators should do in
such areas depends on their views regarding the burden of error in
balancing private autonomy against the general social interest. In
this Section, I discuss three types of motivation that can be charac-
terized in this way: information signaling, price discrimination, and
coordination with other participants in a thin market.
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1. Ex Ante Information Signaling
The way in which an option assigns responsibility for upside risk
to the optionee and responsibility for downside risk to the optionor
also makes it useful as a device for signaling private information.
Often, potential contracting parties have information relevant to
the value of an exchange that they cannot communicate credibly at
reasonable cost. For instance, a seller of a brand new product may
believe with high confidence that the product is a good one but will
find it difficult to convey credibly that belief to a wary buyer be-
cause sellers of low-quality products have a self-serving incentive
to make the same assertion. One common way to deal with this
problem is for the seller to enter into a legally enforceable war-
ranty, and to build the cost of servicing the warranty into the con-
tract price. Because honoring the warranty would be more costly
for a low-quality seller than for a high-quality seller, the fact that
the seller is willing to offer the warranty without excessively mark-
ing up the price is a strong and credible signal of product quality."
Granting an option to purchase is another way for such a seller
to signal product quality. Indeed, a warranty is itself a kind of op-
tion-namely, an option to return the goods if they do not measure
up to the promised quality. The usual warranty of merchantability
gives a moderately strong signal of quality, but an unconditional
guaranty of satisfaction sends an even stronger signal. Some retail-
ers that have special reason to assure buyers of the value of their
wares-for example, mail-order companies such as L.L. Bean and
Lands' End-even offer a guaranty that allows buyers to return
goods for any reason and at any time. (In our framework, this un-
usual guaranty would translate into a put option with T=oo.)
Conversely, a party with private information about the quality of
its likely performance will find it difficult to find a contractual
partner willing to make a nonrefundable up-front payment or
counter-performance. Committing to up-front performance, even
in exchange for a concession on the contract price, is too risky be-
cause of the chance that the party who receives the commitment is
a low-quality partner. Thus, parties who lack information about
7 See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and PrivateDisclosure about Product Quality, 24 J.L. & Econ. 461, 470-77 (1981); George L.
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L.J. 1297, 1303 (1981).
each other, or who are in new relationships, are unlikely to find it
profitable to trade using options with high P and low S. The prob-
lem here is adverse selection; a partner who demands an up-front
unconditional commitment is not to be trusted.
The reason why I classify informational signaling under the
heading of mixed considerations, even though such signaling is
sometimes the only way for parties to engage in an exchange in the
context of adverse selection, is that such signaling operates as an
informational externality in the market. The fact that the parties to
an exchange find it in their interest to signal through the use of an
option or other contractual terms does not necessarily imply that
such terms are socially beneficial because they can have an adverse
effect on other market actors not party to the exchange. To the ex-
tent that a contract term allows a seller to improve its sales pros-
pects by signaling its reliability, for instance, part of this gain comes
at the expense of its competitors. After the signal, this seller will be
perceived as more reliable than average, but the others in its risk
pool will, as a direct consequence, be perceived as less reliable than
average. Unless those other sellers offer similar terms, they will
lose sales.
Such competition through signaling is not necessarily efficient in
contrast to ordinary price competition, which is generally efficient.
Sellers who signal through the choice of contract terms may find
that the more signals that are sent, the more their signaling value is
diluted because sending a signal no longer serves to distinguish one
from one's competitors. The result may be a rat race in which all
parties are worse off than if none had tried to signal in the first
place.75
The proper policy response to such external effects, if they exist,
is not obvious. Depending on the particular circumstances, it may
be possible to improve social welfare either by subsidizing informa-
tion acquisition or by taxing it.76 Because we do not otherwise seem
75The classic formulation of this argument can be found in Michael Spence, Job
Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. Econ. 355, 361-68 (1973) (analyzing equilibria in labor
markets where employees send costly signals of their quality); see also George Aker-
lof, The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, 90 Q.J.
Econ. 599 (1976) (discussing how signals can upset market equilibria).76 See, e.g., Severin Borenstein, The Economics of Costly Risk Sorting in Competi-
tive Insurance Markets, 9 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 25, 32-33 (1989) (demonstrating the
ambiguity of optimal policy response in the insurance setting).
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to have a strong social policy of regulating exchanges to guard
against the externalities produced by excessive signaling, however,
and because it seems unlikely that there is any special reason to
adopt such a policy in the area of option contracts in particular, it is
probably most reasonable to treat such motivations as legitimate
ones in the private contractual area, and to defer to whatever op-
tion contracts the parties choose to design.
2. Price Discrimination
Offering an exchange in the form of an option may also be a way
of separating out buyer groups with different elasticities of demand
and charging them different prices (or, in the case of buyers who
offer options, a way to discriminate between different groups of
sellers). If buyers who value the flexibility of an option are willing
to pay a higher price for the underlying product than buyers whodo not, offering one contract with a low option premium and a high
strike price, and another with a high option premium and a low
strike price, operates to offer a selective discount to the low de-
mand sector of the market. Such a strategy requires, of course, that
individual buyers be unable to assign their contract rights to each
other, because such trade would undermine the price discrimina-
tion scheme. For contracts for the sale of services, however, or forgoods whose location and use is easily monitored, restricting resale
is often feasible.
A standard example of this pricing strategy is found in the airline
industry. Airlines typically sell at least two types of tickets: unre-
stricted use tickets, which can be credited toward the price of a
ticket on another flight or even cancelled without restriction, and
advance purchase tickets, which are nonrefundable and cannot be
credited toward the price of another ticket without penalty. Theformer tickets are substantially more expensive, but can be pur-
chased at any time up until the flight leaves the gate; the latter are
cheaper but can only be purchased some time in advance of travel.
The standard account that industrial organization economists
give of this pattern of prices is that it is a way for the airlines to dis-
criminate between business and personal travelers. Business trav-
elers have more inelastic demand for airline travel and place high
value on the option to change plans. Thus they are willing to buy
tickets with low P (that is, a small unconditional payment) and high
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S (that is, a high price paid in the event they actually decide to
travel). Personal travelers are less willing to pay (they have the al-
ternative of going by car or substituting a local vacation) but often
have greater flexibility in scheduling. Thus they are willing to buy
tickets with relatively high up-front P so long as the subsequent
payment S is small."
In this example, the airline's price discrimination strategy may
well promote economic efficiency, because it helps to cover the
overhead cost of running the airline and maintaining a travel net-
work. By offering both kinds of tickets, the airline manages to ex-
tract a larger portion of the business travelers' surplus from ex-
change while still serving the personal sector at a price that is
closer to its actual marginal cost. The airline covers its overhead
and increases total quantity supplied at the same time.
The reason why I classify price discrimination under the heading
of mixed considerations, however, is that it is difficult to generalize
about whether it increases or decreases economic efficiency on
balance. In some instances, as when two-part pricing helps a firm
with market power to recover fixed costs without sacrificing mar-
ginal sales, price discrimination is efficient." In other cases, how-
ever, price discrimination can reduce market efficiency.79 The in-
dustrial organization literature suggests that it is possible in
principle to distinguish cases in which banning price discrimination
would be socially desirable, but the information on which such a
judgment would depend is difficult to acquire and few commenta-
tors are confident that courts are up to the task. Thus, viewing the
matter from the perspective of efficiency alone, as opposed to
norms of distributional fairness or equal treatment, we should de-
fer to private option contracts that are designed and entered into
for this motivation. As I argued above with regard to the issue of
informational signaling, we do not have a strong social policy of
regulating exchanges to guard against price discrimination in gen-
"For a more formal analysis, see Lars A. Stole, The Economics of Liquidated
Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information, 8 J.L. Econ.
& Org. 582, 591-93 (1992).
" See Walter Y. Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse
Monopoly, 85 Q.J. Econ. 77, 78-81 (1971).
'9 See generally Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 Handbook of Industrial
Organization 597, 631-34 (Richard L. Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
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eral. There is thus probably little basis to apply such a policy to the
category of option contracts in particular.
3. Coordination
Finally, if markets are thin, it might be in contracting parties' in-
terests to structure their exchange as an option in order to coordi-
nate with other parties who are doing the same in their own con-
tracts. To illustrate this possibility, consider a resort hotel that
operates in a remote vacation area along with a small number of
competitors. If all the other hotels in the area have adopted pricing
policies that include large nonrefundable deposits, there will be
relatively few cancellations and hence few rooms available at the
last minute. Travelers will accordingly anticipate that their chances
of finding a room on a walk-in basis are slim, and so few will under-
take to travel to the area without firm reservations. Given the low
number of potential walk-ins, a cancelled reservation will result in
a significant loss expected for the hotel, justifying a steep deposit.
Conversely, if other hotels allow cancellation without penalty,
there will be more rooms available at the last minute, thus encour-
aging more customers to travel without reservations, leading to a
thicker walk-in market, leading to lower expected losses for the ho-
tel following cancellation, leading to a lower required deposit.
What is going on here is a network externality that results from
the fact that some minimum number of transactions is required to
support an effective market for walk-in business. Given this exter-
nality, there can be multiple equilibria in this market, with the spe-
cific outcome depending on the configuration of expectations and
on the participants' past behavior.' In such settings, it is difficult to
draw robust conclusions regarding efficient behavior. Private at-
tempts to coordinate pricing policies could improve efficiency, but
they could also lead to cartel-like behavior and price-fixing. This
motivation is thus a mixed one, possibly justifying regulatory inter-
vention to discourage cartelization or to help parties coordinate on
an equilibrium that they cannot reach privately.
o See W. Brian Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics, in 5 The Econ-
omy as an Evolving Complex System 9, 10-13 (Philip W. Anderson et al. eds., 1988);
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compati-
bility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424, 427-28 (1985).
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IV. APPLICATION TO DOCTRINAL AND TRANSACTIONAL PROBLEMS
The previous Parts of this Article set out a simple theoretical
framework intended to unify our understanding of the various uses
of option contracts. Because this framework incorporates a variety
of economic and commercial considerations that may well cut in
opposite directions in individual cases, however, any attempt to
draw specific conclusions from that framework must be tentative at
best. Indeed, it is for this very reason that I have elsewhere argued
that public lawmakers are not often in a particularly good position
to issue strong prescriptions regarding such tradeoffs, and that pri-
vate parties should be allowed the leeway to choose their favored
arrangement absent credible suspicion of externalities or some
other market failure.8' Nonetheless, the foregoing discussion does
suggest some basic heuristic principles that might be used to assist
both public regulation and private planning. As an illustration of
these principles, in this Part I return to a number of the doctrinal
puzzles that motivated the original inquiry, and analyze them in
terms of the theoretical framework developed above. Then, in or-
der to show that the framework has value in transactional settings
as well, I use it to analyze two illustrative business practices-
vacation deposits and resale price maintenance-that might other-
wise appear anomalous but that can be explained more easily when
viewed from an option perspective. A caveat is in order at the out-
set, however: The following analysis should not be taken as a de-
finitive explanation of the particular phenomena at issue because I
have undertaken no detailed empirical surveys in this regard.
Rather it is offered as a guide to and recapitulation of the basic les-
sons of this Article.
A. Distinguishing Doctrinally Between Standard Contracts and
Option Contracts
As we saw in Part I above, many legal doctrines apply differently
to contracts that are explicitly denominated as options, even
though from a conceptual viewpoint every contract that is enforce-
able through money damages is effectively an option. In order for
this doctrinal framework to be coherent it is thus necessary to iden-
81 See generally Katz, Economics of Form, supra note 2, at 506-14.
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tify some substantive reasons for treating options differently and
some criteria for determining which contracts qualify for treatment
as options and which do not. Because the substantive reasons for
differential treatment are presumably as varied as the specific doc-
trines that provide for it, this Article does not attempt to provide
an exhaustive list of such explanations. Instead, I focus for illustra-
tive purposes on three specific legal applications: contractual pen-
alties, requirements contracts, and firm offers.
1. Contractual Penalties Versus Options
Assessing the use of options as a device to implement contrac-
tual penalties is a complicated matter. There can be many explana-
tions for such transactions because penalties themselves can be
used for various purposes: to motivate specific investment, to signal
information, to facilitate price discrimination, or to exclude subse-
quent competitors.' If the intended penalty is motivated by the
parties' joint pursuit of economic gain, and there are no third-party
externalities that result, it is unclear why one would want to distin-
guish between options and penalties from a public regulatory
viewpoint. If the main explanation for restricting contractual penal-
ties is bounded rationality, however, a formal legal distinction be-
tween the two devices may make sense. Courts and commentators
arguing for strict judicial supervision of liquidated damages have
often stressed the possibility that contracting parties might, out of
excessive optimism or trust, discount the possibility of breach or
the likelihood that such damages would ever have to be paid.'
Casting a penalty clause in option clothing, however, probably
makes it clearer to the less sophisticated party that the payment is
a basic contractual obligation, especially if the penalty takes the
form of a prepaid deposit. The use of an option or a deposit can
therefore mitigate the concern that the party who makes the de-
posit might fail adequately to appreciate the risk she undertakes in
82For a survey of explanations, see Edlin & Schwartz, supra note 36.
8 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal
Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 717, 727 (2000) (citing
Jeffrey B. Coopersmith, Comment, Refocusing Liquidated Damages Law for Real
Estate Contracts: Returning to the Historical Roots of the Penalty Doctrine, 39Emory L.J. 267, 268 & n.6 (1990) (citing Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the
Law of Damages § 147 (1935))).
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doing so. Having to part with cash or other property in hand is a
powerful corrective to such myopia.
Additionally, to the extent that one is sympathetic to the sub-
stantive purposes of the penalty doctrine, it may still be worth dis-
tinguishing between options and deposits that are substantively
equivalent to penalty clauses and have no other plausible economic
purpose, and options and deposits that may have the effect of pen-
alties but that are also motivated by other significant economic
concerns. As an illustration, consider the role played by deposits in
the typical commercial sales contract for new construction, high-
rise luxury condominiums in New York City. Such contracts typi-
cally provide for nonrefundable down payments in the amount of
25% of the overall purchase price, even though in some cases 25%
might well be an overestimate of the developer's lost expectation
should the purchaser back out of the deal.' (Of course, it might
also be an underestimate, as this market is a particularly volatile
one, experiencing local short-run price swings of 25% or greater
several times in recent years."5 )
In this context, the nonrefundable deposit operates as an impor-
tant device for allocating price risk in a volatile and speculative
market. Like financial derivative instruments more generally, it
makes it possible for investors to spread risk more flexibly by split-
ting and selling off portions of both upside and downside risk to
other market participants. The purchasers in such contracts are of-
ten themselves brokers or speculators who plan on reselling the
condominium units to residential purchasers after the project is
completed if marketing to the general public is feasible. Spreading
risk in this way reduces the overall cost of financing commercial
real estate developments, with associated benefits to the develop-
ers, brokers, and ultimate purchasers. Thus, even if the deposit has
the effect, or even is partially motivated by the goal, of penalizing a
canceling buyer, its other economic benefits may justify exempting
'ASee Uzan v. 845 UN Ltd. P'ship, 778 N.Y.S.2d 171,172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (en-
forcing defendant's retention of 25% nonrefundable deposit following plaintiff's de-
fault, on grounds that the deposit was negotiated at arm's length and reflected the
standard percentage in a volatile market for preconstruction luxury condominium
units).
85 Douglas Elliman, Manhattan Market Report, 1994-2003, at 5, 15, 21, 28, 32




it from the usual common law rule prohibiting contractual penal-
ties. Some important commercial jurisdictions have provided just
such an exemption.' More generally, the penalty doctrine should
not be applied to transactions involving commercially sophisticated
parties with significant speculative purposes who are contracting in
a volatile market, on similar logic.
2. Requirements Contracts
A requirements contract allows a buyer to obtain a call option
on a guaranteed source of supply, without herself committing to
purchase any particular quantity. For this reason, such contracts-
as well as symmetric output contracts in which a seller obtains a
put option to sell her entire production output-were not enforce-
able at common law, on the grounds that the party with the option
had given no consideration. The modern rule makes such contracts
enforceable, with the complication that the optionee's discretion in
choosing how much to buy must be exercised in good faith and in
reasonable proportion to estimated or previously traded quanti-
ties.87 These remaining doctrinal limitations are considered by most
commentators to be necessary safeguards against the risk that the
optionee will exercise her discretion in an opportunistic way-for
instance, by excessively increasing her purchases following a sharp
increase in market price in order to resell to other buyers when the
parties had originally anticipated that the buyer would purchase
the underlying good only as a production input.
Requirements contracts have very different risk and incentive
properties than traditional fixed-quantity contracts. A fixed-
quantity contract enforceable via money damages is also an option,
but with a quite different exercise price. Under the fixed-price con-
tract, the strike price, S, equals the contract price minus the ex-
pected cost of damages payable upon breach. Under the require-
ments contract, the strike price equals the contract price in full.
Accordingly, determining which configuration of strike price, op-
tion premium, and term is appropriate (and hence determining
whether a given exchange should be structured as a requirements
8 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131, 139-41 (1881); Maxton Builders, Inc. v.
lo Galbo, 493 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), aff'd, 502 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 1986).
" U.C.C. § 2-306 (2004).
2230 [Vol. 90:2187
The Option Element
contract or a fixed-quantity contract) requires attention to the
various considerations outlined in the framework developed above.
One obvious transactional consideration in this regard is risk al-
location, in that requirements contracts allow the seller to insure
the buyer against the risk of events that affect her ex post demand.
Indeed, it is on risk allocation grounds that requirements contracts
are most frequently justified. But such contracts also serve other
functions appearing on our list. They give the seller a stronger in-
centive to produce goods that the buyer will find useful, and signal
the seller's confidence that the goods will be of high quality and
available in sufficient supply. They also encourage the buyer to en-
ter into relational investments such as storage facilities and pur-
chases of complementary inputs, the values of which depend on the
seller's performance and tender of the underlying goods.
Requirements contracts also have the disadvantage that the
seller, to cover the expected costs of risk-bearing and buyer oppor-
tunism, must set a strike price above his ex post variable cost in or-
der to break even, just as under resale price maintenance the seller
must set a strike price that covers fully allocated overhead cost.
The gap between the strike price and the optionor's marginal cost
of performance implies that there will be some amount of alloca-
tive efficiency, which arises whenever the buyer's ex post willing-
ness to pay for the goods exceeds marginal cost but falls short of
the strike price. Absent some other device for eliminating such in-
efficiencies, such as ex post renegotiation, requirements contracts
are only justified when this inefficiency is outweighed by counter-
vailing advantages of risk allocation and signaling.
As a more specific illustration of these factors, consider the case
of Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., which involved a dis-
pute over express quantity terms in a contract between two chemi-
cal companies.' Columbia, the buyer and defendant, had for sev-
eral years sold significant amounts of nitrogen to Royster, which
used the nitrogen as an input to the manufacture of chemical fertil-
izer.89 Royster then constructed a new facility that produced more
phosphate (another fertilizer input) than it could itself use, and the
companies executed a contract for Royster's sale of a minimum of




31,000 tons of phosphate each year for three years to Columbia,
with an option to extend the term.'O The contract also contained a
standard merger clause that excluded any verbal or prior under-
standings relating to the contract. 9
Between the execution of the contract and the time of perform-
ance, however, the market price of phosphate plunged, and as a re-
sult Columbia ordered less than a tenth of the phosphate that
Royster was scheduled to ship in the first contract year.' When the
case came to trial, Columbia claimed that notwithstanding the ap-
parently explicit quantity clause, the contract was subject to a pur-
ported trade usage under which minimum quantities could be re-
duced at the buyer's option if the buyer turned out not to need the
goods.93 Essentially, Columbia claimed that an apparently explicit
fixed-quantity contract was really a requirements contract. It of-
fered to prove this claim with the testimony of other participants in
the trade and by pointing to its pattern of dealings with Royster on
previous contracts, in which Columbia as seller had allegedly al-
lowed Royster as buyer to treat minimum quantities as optional
requirements.9"
Columbia Nitrogen is generally regarded as the leading authority
on U.C.C. Section 2-202(1), which provides that contract terms
may be explained or supplemented by course of dealing, usage of
trade, or course of performance, even when the terms appear to be
unambiguous or when the writing is found to be a complete inte-
gration of the parties' agreement.95 Its outcome turned on the ap-
plication of U.C.C. Section 1-302(e), which in present form pro-
vides:
[T]he express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of
performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade must be con-
strued wherever reasonable as consistent with each other. If such
construction is unreasonable:
'0 Id.
91 Id. at 6 n.2.
'2 Id. at 7.
9' Id. at 7-8.
'4 Id.
" U.C.C. § 2-202(1) (2004).
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(1) express terms prevail over course of performance, course of
dealing, and usage of trade;
(2) course of performance prevails over course of dealing and us-
age of trade; and
(3) course of dealing prevails over usage of trade.96
In the end, the court held that it was possible to construe the al-
leged trade usage as consistent with the express quantity terms and
so allowed the evidence to go to the jury.,
The court's decision in the case has been criticized on the dual
grounds that it failed to give adequate weight to the express lan-
guage of the contract and that it mistakenly labeled as a binding
trade usage a pattern of behavior that more accurately reflected
the parties' practical decisions not to insist on enforcing their legal
rights.98 Whether this criticism is merited in the particular instance
cannot be definitively determined on the basis of the information
available in the court papers, but the framework of the previous
parts of this Article can certainly be used to shed light on whether
a requirement contract makes sense in this context, either as a gen-
eral trade usage or in the particular contract in dispute. Given a
pattern of dealing between the parties, a thick market on which to
resell or cover, and the expectation of future business, structuring
the agreement as a zero premium requirements contract could well
be efficient as a generalized trade usage. The facts that the under-
lying good was a homogenous commodity subject to price fluctua-
tion in world markets and that parties were operating in part as
brokers for resale to others-both of which would subject an op-
tionor to significant speculative risk-might call this conclusion
into question. But given the differences from the typical business
context of the standard exchange in the industry and from the par-
Id. § 1-303(e).
9451 F.2d at 15.
"See, e.g., S. Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mabelton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581,
584 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1999); Richard
Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate
and Commercial Law 118 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); Victor Gold-
berg, Columbia Nitrogen v. Royster: Do as They Say, Not as They Do (Sept. 24, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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ties' past course of dealing, it would likely not have been a good
idea to apply this usage, if it existed, to the phosphate contract that
underlay the parties' dispute in this case. Specifically, Royster had
just entered a new line of business and had constructed a facility
with significant excess capacity, so it was unclear how this new ar-
rangement would work out or whether the parties would continue
to deal on the same basis in the future. Similarly, Royster had
likely used up significant capital and borrowing reserves in con-
structing its new facility, and it thus faced an increased risk of find-
ing itself in a substantially less liquid and perhaps overextended
position in the event of an adverse price shift.
For these reasons, an arrangement that may have been func-
tional in the usual case was probably rather less so in this new eco-
nomic environment. If the trial court in Columbia Nitrogen had
been alert to these economic considerations, it might have con-
cluded that even if there were a trade usage in the industry making
all contracts into requirements contracts, that usage did not prop-
erly extend to this new situation. Or alternatively, if the parties and
their attorneys had been alert to these considerations at the time
they entered into their contract, they could have avoided the dis-
pute and consequent litigation by explicitly referencing the alleged
trade usage in their contract, and stating clearly that it was not to
apply to this new exchange. These possibilities illustrate how atten-
tion to the economic underpinnings of the option contract can im-
prove legal decisionmaking, both from the perspective of ex post
litigation and of ex ante planning.
3. Firm Offers
Recall that zero premium offers were unenforceable at common
law due to lack of consideration, and still require special formali-
ties to be enforceable today absent an estoppel claim. Reaching a
policy conclusion over whether these rules should be further liber-
alized, or determining whether an offeree's reliance is reasonable
in a particular case, requires understanding why zero premium of-
fers are made in the first place. The above framework suggests at
least two scenarios in which such offers make economic sense, one




The best explanation of such arrangements in new relationships
is that they provide a channel for informational signaling. Specifi-
cally, in situations where a buyer is uninformed about the value of
the underlying transaction, she will be unwilling to pay a significant
up-front premium for an option that she does not yet know
whether she will want to exercise. Indeed, under these circum-
stances it is a rational strategy for an informed seller to offer terms
that are just barely acceptable to the buyer ex post, thus expropri-
ating the full value of the up-front premium." For the same reason,
buyers will be reluctant to make any significant informational in-
vestment in a proposed exchange, even if such an investment is
necessary to evaluate whether the transaction is worthwhile.
The seller thus offers a zero premium (or even a negative one) as
a way of inducing the buyer to enter into the option, and also as a
way of credibly signaling that the underlying transaction is of high
value. Given this dynamic, we should expect to observe zero pre-
mium offers in contexts where the parties do not know each other
very well, as well as in transactions involving new or untested prod-
ucts where other signaling or commitment mechanisms are unavail-
able.
Zero premium price options may also make sense in relational set-
tings as a way of saving on transaction costs. If the parties expect to
engage in multiple repeated transactions, they can omit the up-front
premium, saving the extra cost of recordkeeping and payment proc-
essing, and make up the lost revenues on future contracts. Addition-
ally, to the extent that options serve an insurance function for the op-
tionee, parties who anticipate a long-term relationship can use firm
offers to spread risk over their various individual transactions. And a
practice of offering free options with positive value may also operate
as a type of repeated gift exchange that, for either sociological or re-
putational reasons, helps bond the parties together and thus reduce
the chances of opportunistic behavior."° It may be this type of consid-
'For a formal model illustrating these incentives, see Katz, supra note 58, at 518-
28.
" For example, Professors Fehr and Gachter have shown how repeated gift ex-
change can provide superior incentives in environments where some fraction of the
population is altruistic. Ernst Fehr & Simon GAchter, Fairness and Retaliation: The
Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. Econ. Persp. 159 (2000).
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eration that explains the pattern of behavior shown in Columbia Ni-
trogen.
B. Some Illustrative Transactional Puzzles
As we have just seen, focusing on the option element in con-
tracting can shed light on a number of otherwise puzzling features
of legal doctrine. But questions of option design affect not just
lawyers concerned with the analysis of doctrine, but also lawyers
engaged in the planning of transactions. Options make sense in
some contexts and not in others, and we can use the framework
developed above to help us better understand some of the situa-
tions in which options are and are not used.
1. Variations in Deposit Policies
Anecdotal evidence suggests that hotels and motels operating in
resort areas often vary their deposit policy between high and low
seasons. In season, when demand is high and rates are marked up,
the innkeeper charges a stricter deposit-and not just a larger
amount to correspond to the higher in-season room rate. Rather,
the innkeeper's contract provides for a shorter cancellation period
in which the guest can change plans and still obtain a refund. Some
innkeepers refuse to allow any refunds at all after a deposit has
been paid. Out of season, however, deposit policies are more lib-
eral, and innkeepers may allow the guest to cancel without any
penalty at all up to the expected time of arrival. This variation in
deposit policy can be interpreted as a variation in the terms of the
guest's exit option from the rental contract. In season, the overall
price of the room is high, and the period of time in which the guest
is free to exit without penalty is short. Out of season, the room
price is relatively low, and the period of time in which the guest is
free to exit is relatively long.
Such a pattern of contracting behavior may seem unexceptional,
except for the fact that it runs precisely counter to the usual expla-
nation of deposits in terms of compensation for the innkeeper's
expected losses from cancellation. In season, the innkeeper's ex-
pected losses from cancellation are relatively low, because there
are many tourists in the area and so it is easier to fill the empty
room. Thus a deposit that truly reflected lost expectation would
equal the room rate multiplied by the relatively low chance that the
room would go unrented. Conversely, out of season, when hotels
operate at less than capacity, it is much more likely that a cancelled
room will go unrented, so the innkeeper's losses from cancellation
are relatively high. Here, a deposit that approximates lost expecta-
tion would equal the room rate times the chance of the room going
empty, which out of season is probably one. Why would the inn-
keeper choose a deposit policy that results in overcompensation in
season and undercompensation out of season? What advantages
are there to doing this?
A superficially appealing but ultimately unconvincing explana-
tion is that the in-season deposit is higher because in-season cus-
tomers have a higher willingness to pay. The answer is appealing
because in-season customers are indeed willing to pay more, and
there is a higher consumer surplus for the innkeeper to extract.
The answer is incorrect, however, because there are other ways for
the innkeeper to extract the customer's surplus by adjusting other
terms of the contract without suffering the efficiency loss from an
inaccurately priced deposit. The innkeeper could, for instance,
charge an even higher price for the room while liberalizing his pol-
icy regarding deposits. Such a strategy could raise the same reve-
nue while providing more efficient incentives to a customer decid-
ing whether to cancel her reservation.' ° Innkeepers do not typically
debase other terms of service during the high season, such as cut-
ting back on housekeeping or restaurant facilities. If anything, they
do the opposite and build the costs of those services into the room
rate. Why then would they choose to worsen the terms of the de-
posit?
A variation on this question is why hotels and motels adopt such
pricing policies, but some other service providers do not. Rental
car companies also experience periods of slack and tight demand,
for instance, and they also could require a nonrefundable deposit.
... Puzzles about why sellers do not sufficiently use price to ration quantity in peri-
ods of high demand are often answered with reference to social norms against price
gouging. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 728 (1986); Robert J. Shiller et al.,
Popular Attitudes Toward Free Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States
Compared, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 385, 398 (1991). But there is already a significant gap
between in-season and off-season rates, and it is unclear why social norms would ob-
ject to a further increase in the gap.
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The same is true of restaurants. Such companies do vary their
prices in the form of weekend rates and early bird specials, but
they do not generally require deposits when they take reservations,
even though they easily could (indeed, car rental companies al-
ready require a credit card number as a condition of placing a res-
ervation). Airlines, in contrast, follow an intermediate policy.
Unlike innkeepers, they collect nonrefundable deposits all year
round, but assess them only for some types of tickets (typically ad-
vance discount fares) and not for others, and the prices of these
two types of tickets can vary by a factor of two or more. Does the
optimally designed option vary between these markets, and if so,
why? The analytical framework developed above helps answer
these questions. First, it is clear that this seasonal pattern of deposit
policies cannot be explained in terms of ex post incentives. We
know from the standard economic analysis of contract damages
that setting liquidated damages greater or less than the promisee's
expectation is inefficient, because it leads to inefficient breach
when the damages are too low and inefficient performance when
damages are too high." Here, the structure of the deposits exces-
sively deters the traveler from canceling a reservation in season,
when the deposit is high relative to the resort's likely expectation
losses, and inadequately deters cancellation out of season, when
the deposit is low relative to expectation losses.
Risk bearing seems a similarly unlikely explanation for in-season
policies because the resort has many customers and is in business
for the long haul, and is thus in a better position to spread the risk
of most events that lead to cancellation. (On the other hand, risk
bearing might well explain the lack of deposits out of season.) And
an information signaling story seems implausible because the value
of the exchange to the innkeeper is unlikely to depend on the trav-
eler's private valuation. Indeed, it should be the other way around.
There are, however, three explanations for this pattern that do
make sense. The first is bounded rationality. If vacation customers
do not pay sufficient attention to the risk that they might need to
cancel and thus lose their deposit, but do pay a lot of attention to
... See Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract,
73 Cal. L. Rev. 1432 (1985); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Con-
tract, 11 Bell J. Econ. 466, 468 (1980); Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and
Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. Econ. 121, 125 (1984).
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the posted price, then a resort that chooses an ex post efficient de-
posit and adjusts its room rates accordingly will find that the cus-
tomers respond disproportionately to the latter adjustment. The
resort will thus lose revenues. Under such circumstances, it is pos-
sible that there would be a welfare improvement from regulation
that required resorts to disclose or post their deposit policies on the
same basis as price, although given the likely enforcement cost of
such regulation and the relatively small efficiency loss from mis-
pricing, the case for such a policy does not seem overwhelming. 3
A second partial explanation might be coordination or network
externalities. Specifically, an individual resort might choose a re-
strictive deposit policy in season because given that all other re-
sorts in the area do the same, there are few last minute walk-ins
and the expected loss from cancellation is accordingly large. This
explanation does not account, however, for the failure to require
deposits out of season. Since excess capacity out of season is pre-
sumably common knowledge, the decision of travelers to chance a
last minute trip should not depend on resorts' deposit policies; and
the chances of replacing a cancelled reservation is low in any event.
Efficient ex post pricing therefore requires a deposit to protect the
resort's lost expectation. Similarly, coordination would not account
for the failure of car rental agencies or restaurants to permit free
cancellation (although a comparative advantage in risk bearing
might).
Finally, nonrefundable deposits could be a tool for price dis-
crimination on the model of nonrefundable airline tickets. This ex-
planation could make sense if it were the case that last minute
travelers had more elastic demand than those who make reserva-
tions in advance, which seems at least plausible. Vacation travelers
who reserve in advance presumably have a high preference for the
specific location being reserved, while last minute travelers are
more likely to be choosing among a number of resort destinations.
If so, it would be rational for sellers to want to charge the last-
minute customers a lower price and the advance customers a
higher price. One way to do this would be to cut prices at the last
03 But see Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Econom-
ics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211 (2003) (argu-
ing for policies that prevent boundedly rational parties from making mistakes).
2004]
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minute, but this policy would not be sustainable if it became gener-
ally known, because then advance customers could cancel their
reservations at the last minute and then immediately rebook at the
last-minute price. The deposit policy achieves a similar result by
collecting some of the price charged to advance travelers in the
form of forfeited deposits. Last-minute customers, who never putdown a deposit and hence never lose one, thus pay a lower price on
average. The price discrimination is sustainable, furthermore, be-
cause in order to obtain the lower price, it is necessary to run the
risk of being unable to get a reservation at the particular resort,
which advance customers would be less willing to chance. (Note
that on this explanation, price discrimination works exactly oppo-
site to the way it works in the airline context, where airlines charge
a premium to last-minute business travelers and a discount to those
who book in advance, on the ground that the latter have more elas-
tic demand.)
2. Resale Price Maintenance and Recovery of Selling Costs
A second example comes from the borderline of contract and
antitrust law. Manufacturers of goods have at various times tried to
require their distributors to charge a minimum markup when re-
selling the goods to their own wholesale or retail customers. Thispractice, called resale price maintenance, has long been controver-
sial and is currently illegal under U.S. antitrust law." Opponents of
the practice have made both the formal argument that it is a form
of price-fixing, otherwise per se illegal under the Sherman Act, and
the functional argument that it provides a method for retailers to
cartelize and to exclude competition from more efficient discount-
ers.
105
"' Relevant case law in this regard includes United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362U.S. 29 (1960) and Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373(1911). In 1937, Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Act, which legalized RPM in
states that chose to authorize it in local so-called "fair trade" laws. At the high-water
mark of the practice, four states had adopted such laws. In 1975, however, this act was
repealed and so the practice again became per se illegal, pursuant to prior law. See
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 176-89 (2d ed. 2001).
05 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions and Monopoly Power, 64
B.U. L. Rev. 521, 529-35 (1984).
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Defenders of a more laissez-faire antitrust policy, however, be-
ginning with Professor Lester Telser, argue in response that RPM
may be necessary in order to induce the wholesalers and retailers
to invest adequately in selling expenses such as well-stocked show-
rooms and knowledgeable salespersons."° Otherwise, wholesalers
and retailers who do provide such services will find themselves un-
dercut by cost-cutting competitors who offer low sales and service
quality, and who rely on their customers to do their initial shopping
for free at the high-price outlet. Manufacturers could directly re-
quire their distributors to provide a given service level as a condi-
tion of being allowed to carry the manufacturer's brand, but speci-
fying that service level and monitoring the retailer to ensure that it
is actually provided is expensive, and may be impossible in light of
the subjective nature of the standards by which such inputs must be
measured. 7 On this view, it is more cost-effective to restrict price
competition, thus redirecting competitive pressure into nonprice
directions. Resale price maintenance should accordingly be permit-
ted as a reasonable business practice, rather than treated as a per
se violation of the Sherman Act as it is under current precedent.
In our conceptual framework, however, RPM can be seen as a
specialized kind of zero premium option, under which the distribu-
tor first provides sales and informational services at no cost, and
then stands ready to sell the underlying product at a strike price
that is fixed by the manufacturer-distributor contract. The main
difference between RPM and the standard firm offer is that under
RPM, the option offered to the customer is implicit rather than ex-
plicit. The distributor's obligation to sell may or may not be en-
forceable as a matter of contract law, depending on the contract
formation rules of the local jurisdiction, but it is still an option
"Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ.
86, 89-96 (1960); see also Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War
with Itself 290-91 (1978) (elaborating and endorsing Professor Telser's argument);
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 147-48 (1976) (same).
107 Cf. Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Ar-
rangements, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 356, 359 (1980) (explaining and de-
fending at-will termination clauses on similar grounds); Alan Schwartz, Relational
Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strate-
gies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271, 315-18 (1992) (arguing generally that courts cannot effec-
tively enforce subjectively measured contractual obligations).
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when viewed from an economic perspective, and likely to be car-
ried out for credible business motives.
An analogous issue arises in the field of contract law in connec-
tion with the assessment of a seller's damages for lost profits fol-
lowing a buyer's breach. Under U.C.C. Section 2-708(2), sellers are
entitled to such damages whenever the usual contract-minus-
market damage formula is inadequate to put the seller in as good a
position as performance would have." Conventional wisdom holds
that this is the case whenever the seller is unable to resell the goods
that the buyer refused to take."M But in response to the conven-
tional wisdom, Professor Victor Goldberg argues that in assessing
lost profit it is critical to take into account the up-front expenses
the seller incurred in making the sale initially. '° If the cost of such
expenses is adequately covered by the expected price in the event
that the contract is completed, on Professor Goldberg's view, there
is no need to assess lost-profit damages because the parties will
have implicitly dealt with the problem in setting the terms of their
arrangement, including particularly the amount of any agreed de-
posit. The analysis is similar to the analysis of RPM because if Pro-
fessor Goldberg is right, and the retail price is set high enough to
cover sales costs expended on customers who do not buy, then the
customer's obligation to repay the associated portion of lost profits
ought to be interpreted, as with RPM pricing, as optional.
In order to evaluate Professor Telser's defense of RPM and Pro-
fessor Goldberg's argument against lost-profit damages, however,
we need to explain why retailers might prefer to recover their sell-
ing costs as part of the retail price of the goods, rather than charg-
ing for them directly. Why do automobile or electronics retailers
not charge admission to their showrooms, for instance, so that the
overhead cost of maintaining showrooms would be paid by all who
are investigating a purchase, and so that the units that were actu-
ally purchased could be sold at variable cost? In our framework,
this arrangement would also be a type of option, albeit one with a
... U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (2004).
' For a survey of commentators taking this position, see John M. Breen, The Lost
Volume Seller and Lost Profits under U.C.C. § 2-708(2): A Conceptual and Linguistic
Critique, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 779, 781 n.4 (1996).
"0 Victor P. Goldberg, An Economic Analysis of the Lost-Volume Retail Seller, 57
S. Cal. L. Rev. 283, 290-97 (1984).
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different mix of option premium and strike price. Under this alter-
native arrangement, the customer would, in exchange for the show-
room admission price, purchase an option to buy the good at vari-
able cost if, after inspecting the floor model and conversing with
the sales staff, she still wished to do so. This alternative would pro-
vide customers with more efficient incentives with regard to both
the initial decision to go shopping (because shopping imposes costs
on the store even when one does not buy), and the subsequent de-
cision whether to purchase (because bundling sales costs into the
retail purchase price makes it more likely that customers who have
already acquired the information necessary to decide whether to
purchase will go to a discount chain, even if the discounter's vari-
able cost is greater than that of the high-quality merchant). Why,
then, do more retailers not offer it?
To address these questions, recall the possible explanations why
sellers might prefer to offer a back loaded option. As before, ex
post efficiency is unlikely to be the answer. Because the up-front
informational services do have positive marginal cost, it would be
more efficient, other things being equal, to charge for them sepa-
rately and accordingly to lower the price of the final product. Bun-
dling the cost of pre-sale services into the final product cost means
depressing demand below the efficient level, as those who buy
cross-subsidize those who shop but do not buy.
As we just observed in our discussion of firm offers, however,
up-front cover charges will not work for new or unfamiliar prod-
ucts because buyers are uncertain whether they will want to pur-
chase. Thus, RPM would make sense for firms selling in new but
competitive markets, because otherwise it will be in no single
seller's interest to provide pre-sale services. This is not a plausible
explanation, however, for established firms with a commercial
reputation, and historically it has been branded manufacturers that
have been most likely to engage in RPM. Price discrimination is a
logically possible explanation, but works only if those buyers will-
ing to pay a higher price for customer service and sales-related
overhead are also those who would be willing to pay only a lower
price for the underlying product. (This is a straightforward applica-
tion of the classic product-tying model, here applied to a tie be-
22432004]
Virginia Law Review
tween the underlying commodity and its associated sales quality."'1)
But such a correlation seems implausible if both customer service
and the underlying product are normal goods. Absent a plausible
alternative explanation, we thus might tentatively conclude that the
traditional antitrust critics of RPM are right-the main motivation
for the practice is to exclude competition or to facilitate a cartel
among retailers.
CONCLUSION
All contracts contain features that resemble or that are eco-
nomically equivalent to options, and many contracts are deliber-
ately designed to take account of such options. In designing such
contracts ex ante or in interpreting them ex post, it is essential to
consider explicitly these option features and the costs and benefits
that flow from them. The tradeoff among the basic elements of an
option-the up-front premium paid for the option, the strike price
that the option holder must pay to exercise the option, and the
time period in which the option can be exercised-can affect the
parties' incentives to perform or to invest in the contract, the allo-
cation of risk achieved by the contract, the information exchanged
between the parties before entering into the exchange, and even
their incentive to contract in the first place. Thus, while option con-
tracts may differ substantially across different fields of legal prac-
tice and different economic markets, it is still possible and helpful
to identify and generalize from the basic features of option design.
.1 See William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Bur-
den of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. Econ. 475, 477-90 (1976).
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